Recently, particularly during May, June, and July 2026, the language of nuclear threats in Russian media and statements by Russian officials has significantly increased. So why has Russia started talking more about the possibility of using nuclear weapons? The main reason is that Ukraine's attacks deep into Russian territory are increasingly straining Russia, both economically and militarily.

Especially in June and July 2026, Ukraine began targeting Russian oil refineries, storage facilities, pumping stations, and oil tankers with long-range drone and missile attacks. Many major facilities, including Omsk, Russia's largest refinery, were damaged or temporarily shut down. Gasoline and fuel shortages are being experienced in many Russian regions, with rationing and long queues becoming common in some areas. It's even reported that Russia has begun importing oil from India.

Ukrainian drones are reported to have struck nearly 50 Russian oil tankers in the Black Sea in the last five days. These deep-seated strikes are having concrete and serious consequences for Russia. Targeting oil exports and energy infrastructure directly harms Russia's war financing and domestic economy. Disruptions to fuel production and distribution indirectly strain Russia's conventional warfare capabilities and logistical operations on the front lines. In short, Ukraine is now striking Russia not only on the battlefield but also through its economy. This has become a more troubling development for Russia than the slow progress on the conventional front.

Despite its conventional military might, Russia cannot stop Ukraine or make rapid progress in the war. Therefore, the language of nuclear threats is increasingly used as part of Russia's strategy. In November 2024, Russia updated its nuclear doctrine and lowered the threshold for using nuclear weapons. According to the new doctrine, a nuclear response would be given if a conventional attack by a non-nuclear state, supported by a nuclear power, constitutes a "critical threat" to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia or Belarus.

Here, the non-nuclear state is considered to be Ukraine, and the nuclear powers supporting it are NATO, Europe, and the US. This shift in doctrine was made precisely within this context. What did Ukraine do that made Russia seriously consider this option? Ukraine was not actually the aggressor in this war. It was defending itself against the full-scale invasion launched by Russia in 2022. However, especially from the beginning of 2025 and throughout 2026, a significant change occurred in Ukraine's strategy.

Using long-range weapons acquired from the West and domestically produced low-cost drones like the Flamingo, Ukraine launched a deep strike campaign targeting Russia's rear. Refineries, energy infrastructure, oil facilities, and logistics centers became the primary targets of this campaign. Ukraine's aim here was to reduce Russia's oil exports, thereby cutting off war financing, to create a fuel crisis within Russia, increasing internal pressure, and to make Russia's military operations in Ukraine more difficult logistically.

Furthermore, at NATO summits and in statements by Western leaders such as Finnish President Alexander Stubb, Ukraine's right to strike targets inside Russia was explicitly supported. This was a development that Russia had long considered a "red line." Russia sees that Ukraine's effective and low-cost drone campaign is seriously damaging its economy and war capabilities. While Russia's advance within Ukraine is already slow, these asymmetrical attacks are pushing Moscow towards a harsher response.

The nuclear threat is being raised as the most extreme form of this harsh response. However, China opposes the tactical use of nuclear weapons. According to Zelenskyy, China strongly opposes the possibility of nuclear weapons being used and has communicated this stance to the Russian side in a very clear manner, even in what could be considered an ultimatum. China has followed a "No First Use" policy for many years, meaning it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The Beijing administration has repeatedly stated that "Nuclear weapons should not be used and there should be no nuclear war." China's opposition stems from several key reasons.

Firstly, China knows that a potential global nuclear war would severely damage its economy, exports, and international trade. There is a significant economic relationship between China and Russia in the areas of oil, natural gas, technology, and trade. However, a nuclear disaster would also severely impact Russia. This would mean damage to China's economic and strategic interests in Russia. Furthermore, China wants to adhere to its "no first use" principle in its nuclear doctrine and encourages other nuclear powers to follow a similar line.

In conclusion, the underlying reason for Russia's escalation of nuclear threats is Ukraine's deep-seated attacks that damage Russia's energy infrastructure, war financing, and internal stability. Since Russia has been unable to completely stop these attacks through conventional means, it has increasingly resorted to nuclear threats as a deterrent and pressure tactic. However, China's explicit opposition to the tactical use of nuclear weapons remains one of the most significant external obstacles preventing Russia from pursuing this option. In short, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has entered a much more serious and interesting phase, particularly for Russia.