Abstract
In this paper, I explore the scientific legitimacy of Ideological Possession. To do this, I define Ideological Possession as a kind of addiction. I also establish a working set of behavioral criteria to categorically identify whether a person is ideologically possessed or not. I then explore the potential physiological and neurophysiological markers of ideological possession. In doing so, I propose a series of experiments to see if there are any neurophysiological, psychological, or anatomical differences between controls and individuals who are ideologically possessed. Lastly, I explore the potential evolutionary explanations for ideological possession and use psychoanalytic works by C.G. Jung and Erich Neumann to theoretically explore the soundness of the potential physiological, evolutionary, environmental, and emotional roots of Ideological Possession through Mass Group Identity movements. I sincerely hope this paper opens the eyes of readers interested in the topic of addiction by writing about a relatively unexplored idea, generates new and interesting topics to explore, and I propose a number of ways to do so.
Introduction
Can an idea possess us? Can we be possessed by someone else’s idea? For the past few months, I have been wrestling with this question. I have seen it tacitly proposed by individuals like Jordan Peterson, but is the concept legitimate or is it nothing more than an abstract proposal to help describe the behavior of a group of individuals whose beliefs are perhaps antithetical to ours? To answer this question, I think it would be best if we clarified what Possession means.
Several months ago, I did a significant amount of personal research into the Cognitive Neuroscience of Addiction. While my primary source for the reading was Francesca Mapua Filbey’s text, The Neuroscience of Addiction (2.), I did peruse the majority, if not all, of the sources within her text, and others cited within the sources that she cited. In that time, I also read several other texts, two by Erich Neumann and one by C.G. Jung. These readings led me to the idea that Addiction is simply another name for Possession. Then what do I mean by Addiction and thus Possession?
Criteria and Definition for Ideological Possession
To avoid noise caused by too many overlapping variables, it may be best to avoid the discussion about the etiology of Possession or Addiction and to focus on how we can identify Possession, or Addiction, via observable behaviors and physiological processes in individuals who are addicted, or possessed. To achieve this, it may be useful to start with the idea that SUD (Substance Use Disorder) is analogous to the idea of Ideological Possession. The greatest critique in this assertion I can currently identify is obviously that the abuse of a substance is not equal to an ideology, or belief, taking hold of one’s life, or possessing someone. However, some of the symptomatology may be the same. For example, we may not think that food, the internet, or tanning can be addictive per se, but there is, in fact, a growing body of research that indicates that this is true (2., 3., 4., 5.); i.e., the physiological criteria for addiction can be mapped onto substances that are generally perceived as innocuous. Why couldn’t it be possible for ideas, or systems of belief, to have similar effects on an individual, which we can identify through the symptoms they present, as we would with any other SUD?
To achieve this, I have altered, to a degree, a model proposed by Volkow and O’Brien (6.), which outlines the overlapping behavioral symptoms between SUDs and compulsive overeating.
This outline is obviously a working model, but I see no reason why it cannot be used to categorically assess whether or not an individual is possessed by a belief system. Importantly, this does not mean that all ideologies are bad, just as eating food or spending time on the internet is not bad per se. Rather, when a belief system takes hold of one’s life and starts to dictate what they’re doing, undermining their ability to control themselves, then the ideology becomes a problem. And just as some substances, such as psilocybin (7.), are purported to be beneficial, there’s no reason to believe that an ideology, per se, cannot be beneficial. Rather, the argument being proposed is that ideas, or belief systems, much like addictive substances, can possess us. These working criteria can be used to categorically assess the validity of such a claim.
Before we go much further, as we have been begging the question to a degree, it may behoove us to identify whether or not Addiction and Possession are semantically similar. Addiction is a fraught word. Yet, despite the vehement debates that apparently have arisen from the use of the term, I will try to preserve its initial meaning, which provokes both a positive and a negative connotation. Addiction, from its Latin root, means to “give over” (8.). In other words, I am giving over my time to write this paper, one could give their time over to the judicial system to preserve the integrity of Lady Justice, or one could give over their time as a volunteer to help the needy and to provide themselves with a sense of purpose and belonging. I doubt many physicians would find any of these examples, derived from the Latin definition of Addiction, to be tantamount to disorderly conduct or symptomatic of addiction. However, one could also give their time over to excessive drinking, internet use, sexually explicit materials, eating, video gaming, and even tanning; i.e., they could be giving up their own time, losing control of themselves, suffering withdrawal when they have not “consumed” their drug of choice, and possibly even engaging in risky behavior while acquiring, or upon acquiring, their drug of choice. In both senses, the individual is sacrificing their time in the present for a reward in the future, or their future possibilities for a fix in the present. In either case then, addiction can, in this author’s opinion, be best defined as a sacrificial act to achieve a particular aim in the present, without consideration for future costs. Then are possession and addiction synonymous?
To very succinctly describe the concept of Possession given its Latin root “Possess,” and its past participle stem of Possidere, it is best defined in the positive sense as “to own or to control, that which one is master of,” e.g., the glass on my desk is in my possession (9.). In this context however, we are not discussing the idea that an individual is in possession of themselves, i.e., they are a master of themselves. Instead, our discussion is revolving around the notion that the individual is not in control of themselves, they have not sufficiently mastered themselves, and are thus given over to another master, which they sacrifice to, and are thus possessed, mastered or controlled by. In other words, to be Possessed is to be addicted to something that takes control and masters one’s life, which they sacrifice for, not typically for the better. By better, I will refer to a previous paper I wrote, in which I defined value as, “that which is conducive to the long-term success, or fitness in the Darwinian sense, of people within and without as many environments as possible” (10.). In other words, just as any anthropological exploration of substance use will demonstrate, substances or ideas are not bad per se, but from the perspective of an evolutionary psychiatrist, we may say that the behavior, as it is currently manifest, is maladaptive (11.). This maladaptive behavior may be the result of novel circumstances produced by the culture, or a mismatch of organism to environment. Within this environment, our genes are not able to epigenetically adapt to the change within the environment quickly enough to diminish the negative consequences of the behavior elicited by the environment (12. and 13.). I.e., our genes’ ability to express themselves, though limited, within a novel circumstance to maintain the organism’s fitness, is depressed by the rate at which the environment has changed. To resolve this issue, there needs to be a cultural buffer; in this case, a physician that can care for and improve the behavior of the addicted and, in some sense, possessed individual.
So far, in short, I have established a working set of phenomenological criteria to identify Ideological Possession, and although we should not let definitions do the majority of the heavy lifting for this argument, a semantic link between Addiction and Possession. In the next section of this paper, I will try to lay out the neurophysiological processes within the brain that contribute to the behaviors addicted individuals express.
Neurophysiology and Models of Addiction and Ideological Possession
Beyond seeking to identify whether or not there is a workable definition and criteria for the concept of Ideological Possession, it may also be beneficial to assess whether or not there are any neurophysiological, or neuroanatomical, markers of Ideological Possession. To achieve this, it may be useful to use other physiological and anatomical markers, derived from tanning, food, alcohol, cannabis, internet, or cocaine addicts, as a model for what researchers may look for.
Because the discussion on the root causes of addiction, or ideological possession, may prove to be too tangential, it may be best to focus on, at least for now, what happens once a person begins to excessively use a substance. In short, substance abuse can be regarded as hedonic dysregulation, or an upset of the normal processes that maintain hedonic equilibrium (14.). In other words, as an addicted individual comes into contact with their abused substance, they become sensitized to the substance. Dopamine (DA), Corticotropin-releasing Factor (CRF), and endogenous opioids play a predominant role in the addicted individual, specifically within the mesocorticolimbic system. These neurotransmitters and this hormone respectively play a role in tracking the substance (DA), eliciting a stress response when there is no substance (CRF), and feeling satiated when the substance has been acquired (Endogenous Opioids). As the keen reader may be able to extrapolate, this creates a cycle, especially when the individual is sensitized to the substance and feels stressed when they lack the substance.
Importantly, it is useful to recognize that dopamine plays the role of generating goal-directed behaviors via a series of networked interactions in the brain between such areas as the Basal Ganglia, Cingulate, Frontal Cortex, Precuneus, and even the Cerebellum (15., 16., 17., & 18.). In theory, continued exposure to a particular substance alters the dopamine receptors and sensitizes the reward-seeking system to the particular substance; sensitization then causes limbic centers in the brain, such as the cingulate gyrus and the amygdala, to seek out the substance and to avoid the unpleasant effect of withdrawal; this process then impairs the frontal cortex’s ability to regulate behavior through executive control, which impairs abstract motor plans, which are generated in the cerebellum, and “imagined” in the precuneus, from being communicated to the executive network, and then (via top-down processing) regulating the addictive behavior, to seize the hedonic cycle. This explanation of the addictive process very succinctly, and perhaps too obtusely, defines the physiological processes that occur within the brain/mind of someone who is addicted. Yet, I think this should suffice.
To note, DA is not related to an addicted person “liking” their substance of choice. Rather, it is related to craving or “wanting” their substance of choice (19.). DA release in two sperate areas causes two distinct effects. DA activation in the striatum creates a feeling of ecstasy or euphoria, while DA activation in the OFC creates a feeling of desire. Glutamate then disinhibits executive function in the OFC via DA release, leading to activation of the Ventral Tegmental Area (VTA) and the Nucleus Accumbens Area (NAa), which incentivize drug seeking and impair the addict’s ability to control their desire for the drug that they are highly sensitized to (20.). Over time, this depletes the store of DA in the NAa. The depletion of DA within the NAa then predisposes the addict to a behavioral repertoire that increases their fixation on the substance. The substance serves as a substitute for the depleted DA. This fixation then decreases the amount of work they will engage in unless it is to seek out their given substance (21.). In other words, sensitization to a substance elicits neurophysiological responses that cause an individual to become addicted, and thus possessed, by a substance. The individual then diverts all of their time and energy into acquiring the substance, or the feeling associated with being part of a movement for example, to avoid the sensation of withdrawal when they do not have that substance, or when they are not, for all intents and purposes, proselytizing for their ideology, or cloaking their sense of personal responsibility with a group or ideological movement; the latter of the two are ways to cope from withdrawal from an ideology or group ideology.
When examining the physiological underpinnings of Ideological Possession, Withdrawal will be a significant factor to consider. At least three variables may produce categorical heterogeneity when assessing the symptomatology of ideological possession. These variables include the biology and personhood of the individual being assessed, the environment they exist within, and the patterns of conditioned, or ritualized, behavior that revolve around the belief system or ideology (22.). All three of these should be considered when assessing the ideologically possessed individual.
For example, Brad may have stumbled upon a set of beliefs that alleviated his social anxiety. Brad’s newfound ideology is littered with symbolic imagery, calls to action, and ways to entrench and enrich himself further within the culture he’s engrained himself into. Brad begins to spend a large portion of his time obsessing over his new beliefs, causing him to lose contact with many of his old friends. Even more, Brad’s ideological obsession is causing his grades to slip, he is beginning to fail in school, and he isn’t showing up for classes. One day, a few of Brad’s former friends talk with him about his ideological obsession. Brad hears them out and begrudgingly admits that he has done harm to himself and his former friends. As the days and weeks progress, Brad begins to feel more anxiety, as if he’s lost his place in the world around him. He misses going to meetings, talking about his old ideology with his fellow acolytes, and the sense of structure he derived from the ideology and group. One day, Brad sees a flag bearing the markings of his old group. Overcome with a desire to not feel so nervous, as if he’s betrayed his former ideological associates, Brad reverts back to his old patterns of behavior and starts to obsess about the ideology, which relieved his anxious tendencies and gave him a sense of profound belonging and purpose. In other words, negative affect brought on introspective cues, which were instantiated as patterns of conditioned behavior, which when presented with environmental cues that could lead Brad back to the ideology (a flag), caused a relapse.
This example provides one way to assess whether or not an individual is ideologically possessed. This means that it should be possible to physiologically and anatomically assess if the brains of ideologically possessed individuals have been altered, specifically when they are undergoing withdrawal symptoms, by assessing if they have heightened amygdala activity, or if DA is being suppressed via extended fear states brought on by heightened amygdala activity and the release of CRF (23.). In other words, the reward system, as identified previously, is activated by the ideology or group, when the individual is no longer engaging with the ideology or group, there may be a downregulation of dopamine/opioid peptide systems; this would cause dysregulation of reward systems during withdrawal; and lastly, hippocampal activation and CRF activation during acute withdrawal may persist when abstaining from the ideology. I.e., in the ideologically possessed person, there may be “hypofunctioning of neurotransmitter systems involved in positive reinforcement and a recruitment of neurotransmitter systems involved in negative emotional states that provide the motivation for negative reinforcement” (24.). These variables are seemingly falsifiable, and individuals who are categorically identified as being ideologically possessed can be assessed to see if they exhibit similar physiological symptoms to a typical addict. It would also be possible and necessary to assess how much the ideologically possessed individuals deviate from controls who are not identified as being ideologically possessed. Assessing sample mean deviations from the control mean would ensure that researchers are not judging the ideologically possessed individuals relative to typically addicted individuals, but to individuals who do not have any SUDs and who are not categorically identified as ideologically possessed. This may decrease the bias of judging ideologically possessed individuals to individuals who are addicted to alcohol, nicotine, or cocaine, for example, in so far as the physiological differences may be more significant for the latter than the former.
Cravings can also be assessed in a two-fold manner. To start, I will acknowledge that Cravings are hard to identify. Identification of cravings suffers from the same issue that behavioralist interpretations of animals do. I.e., assessing whether or not one is experiencing a craving that is a conditioned response to a conditioned stimulus and its proceeding physiological manifestations simply affirms the consequent. E.g., the dog is angry because he is snarling, i.e., snarling dogs are angry, or the dog is not angry because he is not snarling, i.e., non-snarling dogs are not angry. As the keen reader may recognize, both of these statements beg the question by affirming the consequent through one of the antecedents. However, side-stepping this logical issue and admitting that it is likely that the dog is angry rather than actually being angry, we can still study cravings. The two-fold manner by which we can study cravings is 1.) by studying the physiological and neurophysiological markers of the initial cue, and 2.) by studying the physiological and neurophysiological markers exhibited once the drug is acquired (25.) Studying at least the first of these in relation to ideological possession in people should allow psychiatrists and neurocognitive researchers to unravel the neurophysiological and anatomical markers of potential ideological craving that’s elicited by imagery associated with the addicted individual’s former ideological group.
Areas of prospective activation caused by ideological cue imagery may be: the amygdala, hippocampus, VTA, Orbitofrontal Cortex (OFC), Cingulate Gyrus, Insula, Ventral Striatum, Thalamus, and Hypothalamus. These prospective areas were activated via cue responses to cigarette smoking (26.) and alcohol cues (27.). Although one might expect that there would be differences in physiological reactivity given the respective substance being studied, this paper’s proposal for cue reactivity in particular areas of the brain (and thus craving) is at least a baseline to assess if activation can be observed in these areas given the fact that one is categorically identified as ideologically possessed. The significance of neurophysiological reactivity to a given cue can also be weighed against a control group to assess if the neurophysiological reactivity in the sample group is significantly different from that of the control group. In other words, it is possible to assess if individuals who are ideologically possessed potentially crave being a part of their ideological movement, or group, when they decide to leave their given movement, belief system, or group, all through physiological, neurophysiological, and anatomical measurements.
Craving can similarly be investigated through Event-Related Potentials, which not only give researchers the ability to map the areas of the brain associated with ideological obsession or possession, but also how such reactions unfold temporally. An ERP study did just this when it assessed how reactive a given word cue was for alcohol-dependent individuals (28.). Higher EEG amplitudes were observed in alcohol-dependent individuals to cue words that were related to alcohol. Given that only alcohol-dependent patients were characterized by signs of increased cerebral activity associated with alcohol-related compared to unrelated cues, craving and the potential for relapse may also be assessed in individuals who are categorically identified as ideologically possessed. Following the same structure, cue-words related to the ideology can be presented to a control group and ideological-dependent individuals; cue-words associated with the ideological-dependent cohort should elicit signs of increased cerebral activity compared to the control group; the degree to which the groups differ can be assessed by measuring how significant the mean activations for both groups are from each other; lastly, the degree of difference between cue-words not related to the ideology can be weighed against cue-words related to the ideology. Again, this is one way to assess if people actually crave being a part of any given ideology, how reactive certain cue words are for the ideologically-possessed, or if they are predisposed to being a part of a given ideology.
Lastly, as Ideological Possession is a type of Addiction, people that are ideologically possessed may express impulsivity, i.e., they may lose control of their executive functioning, or may have innately impaired executive functioning. A person that has impaired executive functioning will show deficits in abstract thinking ability, rule acquisition, planning, and show signs of perseveration, or they will be inflexible, they will be unable to shift rules (e.g., stop-go task). People with impaired executive functioning will also have trouble initiating appropriate actions, or inhibiting inappropriate actions. The key areas of the brain associated with executive functioning are the Prefrontal Cortex (PFC), Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC), and the OFC. Importantly, the OFC plays a critical role in addiction, given its unique position in the mesocorticolimbic system (29.). Impulsivity and impaired executive functioning are associated with anti-social personality disorder, borderline personality disorder, ADHD, and also Addiction (30.). In other words, as a factor, Impulsivity is multidimensional and overlaps with many different disorders and likely is expressed differently as a biological construct and an environmental construct, and in addicts, may be conditioned by behaviors that damage the frontal lobes (31.). This means that when assessing whether or not an individual is predisposed to ideological possession or is trying to break free from ideological possession, researchers and psychiatrists should expect to see disordered executive functioning, overlapping disorders associated with impulsivity, and perhaps, if they are able to, observe physiological degradation, or endogenous anatomical deficits, in the frontal lobes. This hypothesis is tacitly confirmed by assessing individuals with alcoholism (32.) and compulsive eating disorders (33.). Of note, ideological possession or, in this case, ideological obsession, may be rooted in lesions of the insula, as was the case in individuals who suffered from compulsive gambling disorder (34.). I.e., Impulsivity may be a significant predictor for Ideological Possession, which may also be predicted by other psychopathologies like anti-social personality disorder and borderline personality disorder. Assessing the frequency of disorders associated with impulsivity in individuals who are categorically identified as ideologically possessed may be a way to assess whether individuals are predisposed to ideological possession, or whether impulsivity, as is the case in SUDs, leads to ideological possession.
Evolutionary and Psychoanalytic Interpretations of Addiction and Ideological Possession
With a substantial portion of the material previously covered being either clinical or hypothetical, and thus a jumping-off point to engage in experimental research around the topic of ideological possession, at this point in the paper, I would like to engage in perhaps more theory, and maybe even begin to partially explore the potential root causes of ideological possession.
For a start, I think it might be wise to posit why individuals become ideologically possessed. While there are likely substantive biological, behavioral, and environmental differences between individuals with alcohol-use disorder and individuals who are ideologically possessed, the ultimate, or evolutionary, cause given to alcoholism by McGuire and Torisi in their book, Darwinian Psychiatry, may serve as a foundation to build from. One of, if not the, ultimate causes provided by the authors is that, for individuals with alcohol-use disorder, the reproductive behavior system, which is both algorithmic and automatic, is operating at a sub-optimal level. However, the authors also suggest that alcohol-use disorder may have its roots in the individual’s desire to cope with a stress-inducing or dire situation, when one is ostracized by their kin, or when one is lonely and unable to establish non-kin relationships. Given that there are personality differences, and thus physiological differences, between men and women, the ultimate explanation for alcohol-use disorder in females would not be the same as it is in males. McGuire and Torisi propose that women excessively consume alcohol because “they are lonely” or “they have lost contact with or influence over kin” and “because of failures to acquire mates and reproduce.” The common denominator between men and women who have alcohol-use disorder is that, for all intents and purposes, their social bonds have dissolved and they are no longer able to carry out their primary biological imperative, i.e., they cannot reproduce, either do to behavioral, or affective issues.
Interestingly, one of the solutions that McGuire and Torisi provide to alleviate this issue may be the very same coping mechanism that has become maladaptive in ideologically possessed individuals. I.e., McGuire and Torisi suggest that individuals who are suffering from alcohol-use disorder join Alcoholics Anonymous, a group with a set of beliefs or an ideology, which improves the lives of individuals with alcohol-use disorder, at least algorithmically, by getting addicted individuals to participate and grow in a social setting. According to McGuire and Torisi, persons who join AA, “enter an empathetic and positive feedback environment.” This positive and empathetic environment is purportedly helpful for individuals with alcohol-use disorder. They state that frequent interactions of the type found in AA are necessary to “optimize physiological and psychological regulation.”
Ostensibly, in individuals who are suffering from Ideological Possession, as proposed in the hypothetical example Brad, such individuals lack strong and healthy social bonds. However, unlike in individuals who are suffering from alcohol-use disorder, individuals who are suffering from ideological possession stumble upon a group, perhaps even a cult, that gives their life meaning, helps them establish bonds, but ultimately causes them to engage in, at least, impulsive behaviors supported by the ideological framework. These poorly thought-out behaviors then cause them personal harm, or cause harm to those around them, as is often observed in other addicts. This reaffirms what I initially suggested at the beginning of this paper that, like all kinds of SUDs, it is not the substance, or in this case the ideology per se. Rather it is the fact that a novel environment for humans (an environment that is extremely removed from the Evolutionary Environment of Adaptation) is causing a disorder because a once adaptive behavior, in that novel environment, has now become maladaptive. The fact that the behavior is disturbing the individual psychologically and physiologically partially affirms this hypothesis.
Interestingly, a resolution to this problem may not be found in groups like Alcoholics Anonymous for ideologically possessed individuals, but may be resolved by the solutions provided to individuals who are suffering from Dysthymic Disorder. Without belaboring the point, I will just say that dysthymic disorder (DD) is hard to categorize given the fact that many of its symptoms overlap with other disorders. Regardless, the important fact that Torisi and McGuire identified in their examination of DD patients is the fact that there were signs of algorithmic dysregularity, or an inability to update behavioral schemas. In the experiment done on DD patients discussed by Torisi and McGuire, DD patients and controls were tasked with carrying out a set of objectives in a given period of time while also troubleshooting for any issues they experienced on their way. DD patients, compared to controls, suffered from emotional dysregularity when faced with obstacles, which impaired their ability to update their plans, or their behaviors. Importantly, these individuals suffered from an inability to adequately weigh the costs and benefits of the choices presented to them relative to the obstacles that prevented them from completing a given series of tasks. An important fact to note, neither the controls nor the DD patients had to complete every task, they simply had to complete as many tasks as they could within the given period of time provided to them in the experiment; controls completed more tasks than DD patients. Interestingly, DD patients were effectively unable to see themselves as a source of positive change in their environment. This discovery may be the key take away for understanding ideologically possessed individuals if they too are suffering from algorithmic and affective dysregulation. Specifically, DD patients “saw others’ behavior and situational variables (which they often personalized) as the primary source of their dissatisfactions.” Torisi and McGuire also note that, for the control subjects, “there was a positive correlation between viewing oneself as a source of one’s dissatisfactions and the development of novel strategies.” In other words, when individuals took personal responsibility for the situations that they found themselves in, they were more likely to use their executive skills to develop novel strategies to solve problems in their environment rather than blaming all their problems on the environment or other individuals within the environment. While this lack of executive functioning may be rooted in impaired physiological functioning (as noted previously), it may also be indicative of the fact that they never developed the skills to resolve issues within their environment by taking personal responsibility for their actions. Instead, a pattern of blaming their environment or others for their problems was habituated, potentially through conditioning.
For Ideologically Possessed individuals, what this means is that, instead of trying to resolve their problems by seeking out an ideology that gives their life structure and meaning by proposing a set of basic and formulaic axioms, they may best be served by adopting a philosophy that lauds personal responsibility. This doesn’t mean that they should abstain from ideological pursuits, but rather they should be directed towards a philosophy or ideology that emphasizes, at least in part, as one of its core values, personal responsibility. The need an individual has for culture, group identity, and belonging is likely too great to ever erode; Man is a social animal. Therefore, it’s not about abstaining from ideological thought outright, but finding an ideology that promotes positive relations and personal development, as is achieved in groups like AA, Alcoholics Anonymous.
As a quick aside, it might be useful to theorize about the potential sex distribution of ideological possession. Unlike with gambling or other risk-seeking behaviors (35.), ideological possession is more of a social, group phenomenon. This is not to say that impulsive behaviors, or risky behaviors, are unlikely to be observed in ideologically possessed individuals, I think they will (e.g., any act of political or ideological terrorism), but rather, it may be less likely for ideologically possessed individuals to be men than women. On average, women score higher on trait Agreeableness, Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness than men (36.). In theory, given that being a part of a group is not about seeking a reward but to decrease emotional dysregularity, e.g., AA, individuals who seek ideologies to provide them emotional stability, ideologically possessed individuals, will typically be higher in trait neuroticism. How well such individuals conform to the group, rather than arguing with and criticizing the group, will be governed by trait Agreeableness. The desire to be a part of a larger social movement, rather than being more isolated and less social, will also be governed by trait Extraversion. And lastly, the desire to follow the rules or the rituals of the cult (which behaviorally condition an individual to be a part of the cult and return to the cult if they leave), without questioning them, will be governed by trait Conscientiousness. In other words, women are highly likely to be ideologically possessed individuals and perhaps vectors for male ideological possession. When men identify a group of women who are ideologically possessed, they may compete for those women, to reproduce with them, by conspicuously signaling how far they are willing to go for the women through use of the ideology. In other words, ideological possession in women may cause men to peacock (37.) or engage in Zahavian Signaling (38.).
Given that I have explored the potential physiological, proximate, and evolutionary, ultimate, causes of ideological possession, I would now like to explore the concept a little more abstractly through the works of Neumann and Jung. Specifically, a passage from Jung’s The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, and a chapter in Neumann’s The Origins and History of Consciousness, titled, Mass Man and the Phenomenon of Recollectivization.
In C.G. Jung’s book, The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious, there is a chapter titled, The Psychology of Rebirth. In this chapter, Jung explores the psychic change manifested by ritual and culture. Jung takes the motif of rebirth throughout cultures, across the globe, as a sign that, while there may not be a tangible, physical rebirth occurring, there certainly seems to be some sort of psychological rebirth occurring, a metaphorical rebirth. From my own experiences and through my readings of Joseph Campbell and Mircea Eliade, I am inclined to agree with him; i.e., while the physical rebirth may not be literal, there is certainly evidence to indicate that it serves a cultural purpose, as a vehicle to communicate personal transformation. However, given our focus on Ideological Possession, I will be highlighting and building from his analysis of rebirth through a group identity.
Jung defines transformation through identification with the group as, “the identification of an individual with a number of people who, as a group, have a collective experience of transformation.” Jung then proceeds to distinguish group transformation from personal transformation brought about through a rite of transformation, but indicates to us that personal transformation is not contingent upon a group. Jung then proceeds to highlight the qualitative difference between personal transformation and group transformation by stating, “the resultant [group] transformation experience bears only a very remote resemblance to the experience of individual transformation… due to the fact that, when many people gather together to share one common emotion, the total psyche emerging from the group is below the level of the individual psyche.” In other words, group transformation is less refined because it does not involve the whole of an individual, and all his psychic elements, but isolates and emphasizes only a single part of the individual. As the group increases in size, Jung suggests that this effect will cause the collective psyche to appear more animalistic, “which is the reason why the ethical attitude of large organizations is always doubtful.” Jung then states: “The psychology of a large crowd inevitably sinks to the level of mob psychology.” To reiterate, this is because the individual, a whole psychic unit, is not being highlighted and expressed, but only a low-resolution version of the individual, and only a single part of him, which results in more of a barbaric, animalistic transformation than a coherent, individuating process; through group transformation, group possession, man becomes an unyielding and incoherent beast. While this kind of transformation is easy for the individual to achieve, it is obviously quite costly in the long run; a sign of impaired executive functioning.
This “simple and easy path,” as Jung puts it, is inevitably hollow, resulting in a similar effect as to the one observed in the homeostatic model of dysregulation. Very specifically, Jung says, “you must have continual recourse to mass intoxication in order to consolidate the experience and your belief in it” (italics added). In other words, once taken up by the vain, prideful ecstasy of being a part of a mass movement or ideology, to feel that high once more, the individual must necessarily seek out the group again. Without doing so, they simply experience themselves sans the elation of being a part of the ideological movement, or group; they experience themselves as individual, bereft of the momentary ecstasy elicited by the mass ideological movement. In other words, like Brad, without the group, they lose their sense of belonging, purpose, and they yearn, go through group or ideological withdrawal, to be a part of the mass ideology once again. Jung defines this as Participation Mystique or, an unconscious identity manifest through identification with the group, which is lower than the individual’s consciousness bringing forth an unconscious identity up from the unconscious depths by itself, and thus being transformed by it.
Jung then proceeds, as this paper has tried to do, to highlight the fact that all mass movements are not inherently bad and there are facts about group movements that demonstrate a group’s “positive enthusiasm, which spurs the individual to noble deeds,” or that group movements manifest a positive “feeling of human solidarity.” I.e., a group movement can give a man the feeling of being “a man among men.” A fine example of this, once again, is Alcoholics Anonymous. However, as Jung points out, there are other examples, such as identification with the State, which manifest equally abominable facts. For example, Jung states, “one sees this [i.e., taking gifts for granted instead of making an effort to obtain them for ourselves], unfortunately, only too plainly in the tendency to demand everything from the State, without reflecting that the State consists of those very individuals who make the demands.” Jung states that this eventually leads to Communism, or its like, “where each individual enslaves the community and the latter is represented by a dictator, the slave-owner.” The observant reader may recall that individuals with Dysthymic Disorder suffered from a similar issue; i.e., they personalized individuals and objects in their environment as being the cause of their problems rather than seeing themselves as the locus of positive change in their environment. I.e., both groups lack a sense of agency and personal responsibility and enjoy the ecstasy of not having to take personal responsibility for their actions, exacerbating the hedonic cycle and instantiating a pattern of avoidance behavior, caused by negative affect or withdrawal symptoms.
Lastly, to further explore the consequences of ideological possession, I think it would be wise to explore the work of Erich Neumann, specifically his work, The Origins and History of Consciousness. However, more specifically, I would like to explore a chapter in that text, Mass Man and the Phenomenon of Recollectivization.
Unlike Jung, Neumann begins to explore recollectivization, or mass movements, from its root causes. Specifically, he highlights the fact that during the course of Western Development, a split occurred between the Unconscious and the Conscious. Before moving forward, I will loosely define the Unconscious, for theoretical purposes, as the oceanic aspect of the psyche from which symbols for the ego and self emerge, transforming and being transformed by the world. However, returning to the topic, this schism between the Conscious and the Unconscious has resulted in overspecialization and atomized individualism; Western Man has identified not with a mix of the unconscious and the conscious, but only the conscious, rational, dominating, discriminating, and illuminating self. He then specifically states while, “on the one hand we see ever larger groups of overindividualized persons, there are on the other hand ever larger masses of humanity who have detached themselves from the original situation of the primary group and entered into the historical process.” In other words, the enculturation of Western man, to a degree, has separated him from his origins, which I have previously described in this paper as the environment of evolutionary adaptation. This separation, which had to be reconciled in the psyche through archetypal imagery and culture, thus thrusting man into history, is taken to its extreme through the exaltation of “the mass as a conglomeration of unrelated individuals” via its obsession with the conscious, rational, dominating, and discriminating aspect of Man.
However, as I have also tried to address in this paper, Neumann does not, nor can he, deplore the group. Neumann does not consider the clan, tribe, or village, as a problem per se but rather identifies the problem as “mass units” of people, which can be identified through cities, offices, or factories, e.g. These “mass units” alienate the individual from the unconscious, emotional participations, and all emotional burdens are laid upon the shoulders of the individual, alone. This is the State, “a purely nominal structure which, in a manner of a concept, comprises a variety of different things, but does not represent an idea that springs as a central image from a homogenous group (italics added).” In other words, the State is a mass of individuals without a center, propelling every individual into a current whose velocity is increasing exponentially, but which also lacks any coherent aim. Obviously, this would increase the rate at which neuroses develop, or more clinically, increase the general populations trait Neuroticism.
For a while, Neumann posits that issues will be prevented via family unity, but over time, the culture’s tendency to emphasize the Conscious Self and to suppress the Unconscious dissolves this bond, as well. In other words, the disintegration of the family unit is associated with an increase in patterns of behavior or traits that would predispose someone to Ideological Possession; here we find another area of potential exploration. Neumann specifically points out that this overemphasizing of the Conscious Man disturbs the hyper-individualized man, specifically when he “is confronted with the other nations and races and with other cultures, other economic patterns, religions, and systems of value.” This disturbance is partially rooted in the fact that he is hyper-individualized but also in the fact that, because he lacks a center, all of the aforementioned cultural canons become relativized, leading to an emotional disturbance; as if he recognizes that he’s lost his footing in the world and is now tumbling down, into that part of himself that he was avoiding: The Unconscious.
In Neumann’s own words, he states:
"The global revolution which has seized upon modern man and in whose storm center we find ourselves today has, with its transvaluation of all values, led to a loss of orientation in the part and in the whole, and daily we have new and painful experiences of its repercussions in the political life of the collective, as well as in the psychological life of the individual.”
This loss of orientation is, in part, rooted in the fact that the shadow side of the personality, an archetype of and for the unconscious, is “inferior” and “underdeveloped” because it represents the “archaic side” of man, and because it “bears all the marks of the primitive psyche and thus stands in significant contrast to the original group man.” This shadow, unlike in the societies who have incorporated this aspect of their psyche into the culture, is best referred to as “mass man.” The “group man” is unconscious, but he lives under the rule of centroversion; a world built from the inward perspective of Man, bringing the incoherent, undifferentiated external world into order through himself. He is also complete, indicated by his ability to generate consciousness, individualization, and spiritual growth. In other words, the “group man” enables cultural construction, synthesis, and for the creative powers to manifest, all in “his culture, his society, his religion, art, customs, and even in what we call his superstitions.” This underdeveloped group man stems from Western Man’s tendency to, once again, emphasize Consciousness as the only source of enlightenment, reason, and knowledge. In doing this, Western Man neglects another core aspect of his psyche, his Unconscious, resulting in psychological disequilibrium, or psychological neurosis, that inevitably manifests itself in the culture because it is ignored within himself.
The group man’s dangerous tendencies are suppressed because they are no longer automatic; in other words, group man has been tamed. However, for Western Man, mass man, who has not been civilized, poses a significant threat, specifically because he has been neglected. The mass man “resists conscious development, is irrational and emotional, anti-individual and destructive.” The mass man also “corresponds mythologically to the negative aspect of the Great Mother,” as “her murderous accomplice, the adversary and manslaying boar.” This is the “beast-man.” The only way to integrate this aspect of the psyche is to descend “into the depths of the unconscious, there to seek him out and bind him to the conscious mind.” This is the aim of the hero. However, this does not always happen. Sometimes the beast-man overcomes the hero, or the man who descends into the unconscious seeking out the beast-man, for whatever reason. When this happens, “we get the frightful phenomenon of regression to the mass man as manifested in the mass epidemics of recollectivization.” This is how the beast-man becomes the mass man.
For the hyper-individualized, hyper-rational man split from the unconscious, this is too much to bear. Specifically, “his isolation in a mass which no longer offers him any psychic support becomes unendurable.” His neurosis becomes too much to bear by himself. In part, this is because “the archetypal canon, which used to support the average man, has given way, and real heroes capable of taking up the struggle for new values are naturally few and far between.” In other words, all on his own, without a culture and its symbols to support him, without any path to take because all his paths have been eroded or made meaningless by relativism, man is faced with an insurmountable problem, and thus he is overcome by mass man, he moves towards recollectivization, he becomes ideologically possessed.
Neumann states that:
"Whereas in a homogenous psyche, the negative element [group man and the Terrible Mother have] a meaningful place as decomposition and death, as chaos and prima materia, or as the leaden counterweight which roots growing things to the earth; in a fragmented psyche with a defeatist, regressing ego, it [mass man and the Terrible Mother become] a cancer and a nihilistic danger. With the disintegration of ego consciousness, all the positions built up in the course of human development are regressively destroyed, as in psychosis.”
In other words, because this shadow of the unconscious has not been integrated, the culture does not have a symbol for it, and in fact, has done everything in its power to avoid having to face it. If the culture, or an individual, has to face it, they are overcome by it, because they have no way to reconcile it and thus psychosis, or a disturbed psychological state follows. This results in a loss of all psychological values, and the sovereignty of the individual is dissolved, replaced by “collective modes of behavior.” Due to severe neurotic tendencies, to alleviate their psychological suffering, the individual adopts a group identity, and thus becomes possessed by the group’s ideology to prevent psychological duress. When this happens, “the daemons and archetypes become autonomous again, the individual is swallowed back by the Terrible Mother [a disturbingly pleasant experience], and along with it the experiences of the voice and the individual’s responsibility before man and God are invalidated.” Once again, much like individuals with DD, or who are prone to impulsive behavior, executive functioning, a sense of personal responsibility or agency, is extremely diminished, or “invalidated” in individuals who have undergone ideological possession, potentially because they were and prefer to be coddled.
Neumann then states that, “Effeminacy then makes its appearance as invasion from the unconscious side, manifesting itself in the breakthrough of complexes, of the inferior function and the shadow, and finally in a semipsychotic eruption of archetypes.” His emphasis on the word “Effeminacy,” while likely not intending to highlight women as a cause of ideological possession, is an intriguing one. As the reader may remember, it is this author’s opinion that, because of the general personality of women, when their cultural foundation has been dissolved, they are likely to be the first to adopt a new ideology, to become possessed by an ideology, specifically a group identity. In turn, this causes competition between men, specifically to gain access to these women, which results in conspicuous signaling or Zahavian signaling, making use of the new ideology’s beliefs.
Neumann then posits that this loss of executive function, for all intents and purposes, and the adoption of a group identity, or recollectivization through the mass man, results in chaos. He suggests this is the case because the complex unit of individuals is dissolved into a centerless mass, with no legitimate aim. Neumann then suggests that, because the unconscious, the beast-man, who would’ve been group man, now turned mass man, was neglected, to compensate for the overabundance of consciousness, conscious man directs his efforts at destroying all things that resemble consciousness, including himself. This process can be resolved only if the group, or more likely individual, is made aware of this tendency. However, being made aware of this tendency, it may induce symptoms similar to withdrawal, or emotional dysregularity, leading to a relapse and a descent back into the group identity, or ideological possession. After all, these individuals are intoxicated by the group ideology.
In Neumann’s own words:
"The toxic effect of the mass situation lies precisely in its intoxicating character, which is always a concomitant of the dissolution of consciousness and its powers of discrimination. As we saw earlier, the libido-link between the ego system and the unconscious is “pleasurable.” So it is when the link snaps and the ego system sinks into regression. The old bait with which that wily rat catcher, the ‘hypnotized hypnotist’ of mass epidemics, seduces us is uroboric incest.”
In other words, recognizing that their conscious state has caused them such profound emotional duress, the individual adopts an ideology, which provides them comfort in the form of a group identity. This identity, having been neglected, then focuses all of its wrath upon the aspect of itself that had neglected it, the Conscious self. In turn, overcome by its unconscious self, the mass, beast-man, the individual destroys their conscious self, the rational, knowledge and symbol generating man. This self-destructive and self-consuming symbol is the Uroboros. With the destruction of the conscious man, man descends into only chaos, destruction, and death through the dissolution of his culture and himself.
All of this stems from a desire for unity, a desire to be a part of something larger than one’s self, which is lost in a sea of atomized, aimless individuals. However, the mass recollectivization of man is anything but a source of meaning. Instead it is a mirage. The collective is a mirage, the pseudo-ideology or morality is an illusion, because it “is incapable of producing any genuine and durable participation, much less anything constructive.” Real groups are defined by their concept of mutual responsibility and their willingness to sacrifice for each other, which do not just manifest with the exultation of the group, but are embodied “in institutions and communal undertakings.” Mass Man is incapable of engaging in creative synthesis, and thus is incapable of manifesting any concept of mutual responsibility or engaging in any legitimate, and profoundly virtuous, acts of self-sacrifice, such as sacrificing one’s self to defend the lives of the group’s, or your own children. This deprives man of meaning, and thus perpetuates his destructive cycle and erodes his sense of personhood, individuality, and his ability to generate a legitimate self. In other words, it perpetuates his addiction to the belief system and to the group identity; he remains ideologically possessed.
To alleviate this issue, societies try to use the old archetypal symbols to direct the aimless masses into a coherent and meaningful structure. But this is futile. The archetypal symbols of the past have lost their meaning, Man has become too distanced from their origin; such archetypal symbols are dead. When mass man recognizes this, though for a time he may climb his way out of the mass, he eventually relapses back into the mass identity. He is unable to become the hero because, “the subjective delirium which accompanies [a partial group identity] harbors in itself the most dangerous and destructive consequences.” In other words, he is unable to become the hero because by adopting this group identity he reduces himself to nothing more than a member, an atom, in the collectivized mass. For the primitive man, this resulted in an expansion of the ego, of himself, because he was being “reborn” through his own understanding of the symbols and the archetypes. In modern man, mass movements reduce man to what the group believes the symbols mean, welding every discombobulated and aimless atom into an abominable, “mere conglomeration.” As Neumann points out, this produces “blind brutes.” Because the mass is “psychologically unrelated, or only momentarily related, atomized individuals,” destruction follows.
In other words, because the ideologically possessed individual has, in some sense, forfeited their executive functioning, they engage in impulsive behaviors, which are definitionally destructive or damaging to the individual, or the people around them.
The group man, compared to mass man, is regulated by the cultural canon which each member of the group has contributed to and has a responsibility, or duty, to maintain. Without this kind of cultural canon, the action of the shadow side is intensified because it cannot be regulated, no individual can hold any other accountable, as everyone is anonymous, and no one is personally responsible for the possession; instead, they are collectively responsible, which means what, precisely? In this way, when the individual is “removed” from his group, “he becomes capable of anything.”
Neumann then proposes that, despite the fact that the group is overwhelming, the personal responsibility of the situation the individual is put in is too much to bear, the consequences of ideological possession, specifically ideological possession based on a group identity, is determined by the quality of the individual within the mass. Neumann suggests that this is determined by the “quality of the whole personality.” In other words, the more complete, psychologically developed, and thus cultured the individual is, the less likely it is that he or she will succumb to the mass movement, or ideological possession. Once again, it seems to me as if Neumann is emphasizing a culture of personal responsibility and development, but also suggesting that the individual be supported by a group, a fellowship, whose aim is to develop the troubleshooting and scenario building capacities within the individual to overcome the disintegration of the self. In doing this, the group should be capable of guiding, through written or perhaps verbal therapy, the individual through their Hell, much as Virgil did Dante.
Unfortunately, Neumann also points out that the conscious, “the ‘voice,’ that inward orientation which makes known the utterances of the self, will never speak in a disintegrated personality, in a bankrupt consciousness, and in a fragmented psychic system.” Physiologically, some addicts, some individuals, may lose their executive functioning. Through the use of drugs, they exhibit extreme signs of psychopathology, becoming lost, hollowed souls; they yearn only for the Terrible Mother’s embrace, which they find in their personal and precious poison. Thus, while it is the aim of this paper to explore what Ideological Possession is, to propose ways to study the disorder physiologically, and to give it a substantive evolutionary and psychoanalytic foundation, this paper has to admit that there will also be people, whole societies, who will be unable to turn from their disorder. While I would like to say that this is mere tragedy, this unwillingness to become consciously aware of the fact that they are ideologically possessed by a group identity is more akin to a sign of evil; it is a deliberate, and conscious, missing of the mark to perpetuate and preserve only a morsel of momentary delight or pleasure. To take an entire culture or society with you by doing this cannot be considered a mere tragedy; it is an act of evil, it is a sin.
Conclusions
In the end, the aim of this paper was to 1.) propose a workable definition for ideological possession based on the etymology of possession and its relation to the concept of addiction, and a set of criteria that can be used to categorically identify if a person is ideologically possessed or not. I also wanted to 2.) establish a set of physiological markers that, while also being associated with other forms of addiction, serve as a basis to begin studying ideological possession from a scientific framework. These potential physiological markers of ideological possession support the fact that ideological possession is potentially a falsifiable phenomenon; i.e., ideological possession is not a spiritual absurdity, as some would suggest, but is of legitimate scientific concern. And lastly, 3.) I wanted to establish that ideological possession has an evolutionary explanation and is supported by psychoanalytic analyses written by Jung and Neumann. The latter exploration also confirmed some of the potential behavioral and physiological evidence explored in the second section of this paper, at least in theory.
While none of the proposed experiments have been conducted yet, it is clear that, at least from the psychoanalytic literature and other theories based in Darwinian Psychiatry, something like Ideological Possession does exist. While I would have liked to explore the potential root causes of ideological possession a little further, such as SES or Intelligence, I think it may be best if I leave such discussions for another time.
I think the most significant critique of this paper will be that no clear evidence for Ideological Possession exists. I.e., the literature used to propose potential physiological areas of interest when studying Ideological Possession are areas that are activated by other drugs, which differ between each other, and thus will differ from Ideological Possession. However, the aim of the proposed experiments is not to say that those areas are, in fact, activated when, for example, exposed to ideological cues, or that there will be physiological and anatomical differences, e.g., in the amygdala and frontal lobes, in individuals who are ideologically possessed, but rather, that there may be differences if ideological possession is a kind of addiction, or SUD, which I see no legitimate reason to believe that it is not. In fact, the true meat of such explorations will likely be in how significant the differences are between controls and sample subjects, and whether the differences predispose individuals to be ideologically possessed, or are the result of being ideologically possessed. The latter of these explorations would be most intriguing to unravel for voracious neuroscientists.
Secondly, I would also suggest that temporal analyses of individuals who are categorically identified as ideologically possessed be one of the main areas of exploration. For a start, it is far less costly to explore the temporal dynamics of cue responses in SUD individuals and potentially ideologically possessed individuals. Temporal dynamics also enable neuroscientist to avoid the accusation of engaging in modern day phrenology. While it is obvious that topographic analyses of neurophysiology are not merely “modern day phrenology,” to begin analyzing this likely fraught subject, it may be best to avoid unwanted and unneeded criticisms.
I hope that this paper at least opens the eyes of readers who are interested in the Neuroscience of Addiction and, in some way, contributes to the literature by generating new and interesting matters to study and explore.
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