Why did James Burnham believe that a social revolution occurred after WWI? Over the past several weeks, I’ve taken the time to read Burnham’s essential works. I started with Suicide of the West, proceeded to Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom, and am currently reading The Managerial Revolution. The latter of these three works seems to be Burnham’s core thesis: a social revolution has occurred, ushering in the managerial age. Here, I would like to review why he felt a revolution had occurred.
Overall, the aims of the Managerial Revolution, according to Burnham, were to demonstrate that his social milieu had transitioned and present the theory of the managerial revolution (p. 4). Whether true or not, Burnham suggests that most people around him think there’s been some transition but do not have the words to describe it. They can instinctually sense something is off but do not know what. Burnham seeks to ameliorate this issue by presenting a descriptive theory (his theory of the Managerial state). This theory is not concerned with moral polemics, nor is it a “program of social reform” (p. 5), or so Burnham claims. Instead, he is interested in why the world is in the midst of an elite transition, how this transition is taking place, what institutions it's affecting, and how.
First and foremost, Burnham believed that the Capitalist society was disappearing and was being replaced with the managerial society. Burnham argues that the capitalist elites can no longer hold political control over their society. Their institutions are failing, they cannot adapt to changing circumstances, and the myth of Capitalism as an inspiriting force can no longer motivate the elites' subjects to act on their behalf. He points to issues such as mass unemployment, recurring economic crises, the problem of debt, restrictions placed on monetary exchanges, collapsing agricultural markets (whose problems are exacerbated by the issue of debt and government subsidies), wasted investment funds (which are tantamount to unemployed capital), the West’s inability to profit from third world development (e.g., South America), ‘technological unemployment’ or the inability to use the technological inventions of Capitalism, and the impotence of bourgeois ideologies (pp. 28-32). As I read these pages, I recognized that much of what he says here about Capitalism informs what he regards as symptoms of a shifting elite class in Machiavellians (p. 208).
Secondly, he argues that the Theory of the Socialist Revolution has failed to come to fruition. The main flaws Burnham points to are that the sequence for the Proletariat revolution never follows its supposed course (p. 35) and that there are other alternatives to the Socialist Utopia (p. 37). Burnham notes that during the socialist revolution, after the working classes take power and private property is abolished, the dictatorship of the proletariat never unravels into a socialist utopia. Instead, the socialist revolution stops at the dictatorship of the proletariat, where the socialist society’s elites maintain their grip on power. Secondly, while Burnham is content to acknowledge that capitalist society is failing, he does not think that there are no alternatives to Socialism. In essence, if capitalist societies are failing (which Burnham agrees with) and Socialism is the only alternative to Capitalism, then there will be a socialist utopia. However, if a socialist utopia wasn't meant to be, then either Capitalism didn’t fail or there was an alternative to Capitalism. Burnham believes the second half of this necessary condition holds.
Burnham believes the dictatorship of the proletariat failed in Russia and points to several facts to demonstrate this. First, the income disparity between the upper and lower classes did not dissolve but differentiated further (pp. 41 -42). Secondly, class distinctions became more prominent; the dream of a classless society was just that (p. 42). Lastly, Russia did not become internationalist but instead continued to advocate for its national interests internationally; its appeals to internationalism were simply a veneer to acquire power nationally (p. 43). Marxist revolutions were also bound to fail in other countries. For a start, most workers are unskilled in the technical crafts necessary to become cogs in the modern industrial machine. This means that they can’t seize the means of production like a technically skilled worker can. Modern warfare also required men to utilize machines like aircraft and tanks. which the average revolutionary in any country would be incapable of using and resisting the advances of; their revolution would be suppressed quickly (pp. 46-48). Ultimately, Marxist parties failed in every country they tried to assert themselves within, as well; their ideology was unmotivating. The cascade of failures by Marxists throughout the West signaled to others that it was time to abandon Marxism as a political philosophy put into praxis (pp. 48-52).
Burnham demonstrates that, with the fall of capitalist society and the failure of socialist society, there's a power vacuum for an elite class to take advantage of. This elite class wants access to the production of goods and the ability to control the distribution of those goods. This, Burnham argues (pp. 54-55), is what power is. The most effective way to determine who has power in any society is to examine who is paid the most. The elites, who had ascended as Capitalism failed, were essentially fighting physically and ideologically for the right to rule (pp. 57-58).
To demonstrate how an elite shift could occur, Burnham looked toward history, specifically: Capitalism’s rise. The capitalists' ascent started when a.) they took advantage of already established rights to acquire personal wealth (p. 60). Then, the capitalists used their acquired wealth to leverage their power and garner favor with the feudal lords. b.), the capitalists bribed feudal lords or kings, and curried their favor, enabling them to gradually seize the means of production (or land, at that time) for themselves (pp. 62-63). c.) over time, capitalists put people in favor of their rule in positions of princely power. Yet, when these princes were no longer useful, the capitalists asserted themselves as the rulers of the society; they no longer had to conceal their rule from the masses or other elites (p. 63). A good majority of these capitalists, according to Burnham, came from the old ruling class. These old elites used Capitalism to preserve their power by, for example, “driving the serfs off their lands,” engaging in mining, or venture Capitalism by selling gold and jewels they already owned (p. 64). In many ways, Capitalism as an ideology was just a way for elites already in power to oust fellow elites who could threaten their power. These features defined the struggle for power during the transition from Feudalism to Capitalism and, now, from Capitalism to Managerialism.
Burnham argues that the managers have ultimately seized power by taking advantage of the weaknesses of capitalist societies. Whether they’ve done this consciously or not is “not really at issue” (p. 67). Instead, what’s important is that the managerial class found themselves in control of the means of production post-WWI and, thus, had control or ownership over the distribution of the produced goods. They, therefore, were the most powerful and highly-paid class. Ultimately, the managers will fully assert their rule over the society, according to Burnham, when the state asserts “ownership over the major instruments of production” (p. 66). They will achieve this by “[exercising] their control over the instruments of production and [gaining] preference in the distribution of the products, not directly, through property rights vested in them as individuals, but indirectly, through their control of the state which in turn will own and control the instruments of production” (p. 66). Earlier in the Managerial Revolution, Burnham suggests that the historical precedent for this kind of behavior can be found in the priests of ancient Egypt (p. 38). In this way, the state becomes a product of the managers, is controlled by the managers, and as a product, it can be distributed by those who produced it, i.e., the managers. This means that they can disproportionately hand state power back to themselves. In effect, the managers became priests and pharaohs, while the state's people became their slaves.
To answer this piece's initial question: Burnham felt the managerial revolution had occurred because Capitalism had failed and Socialism wasn't a viable alternative. Given that there was a power vacuum, and that void needed to be filled by someone, that someone was to be the managers.
I’ve reviewed Burnham’s work for several weeks now to see how the Right can improve politically. What I’ve taken away from my review of the first few chapters of The Managerial Revolution is that it is prudent to work within and through the current paradigm to acquire power. This is precisely what the capitalists did in European feudal societies, and it is what the managers before WWI had done to serendipitously find themselves in control. However, it must be made clear that just because this is how the capitalists initially took power does not mean that power must be taken this way or will. Instead, the managers may themselves be unseated through technological advancements. Effectively, if there is a way to make individuals self-sufficient managers, i.e., capable of producing what they want for themselves, then the managerial elites will be unseated. Automation would be one way to achieve this task; perhaps that is why there's a scramble to prevent its advancement or implementation; it makes evident the elites’ inadaptability.
Still, the Right cannot rest its laurels on such pipe dreams. Instead, it must work with what it has. Working within the current paradigm means currying favor with sitting elites, developing managerial skills, and building alliances with others who can produce. This last part, self-production, is essential. Self-production is, as Burnham defines it, power. If the Right can engage in self-production, i.e., control the means of production, at whatever level (economic, ideological, or cultural), for itself, it will be better off. Engaging in any other form of consumption is a sure way to lose because doing so is, generally speaking, aiding its enemy. Yet, the Right must also realize that the state, as a product of the managerial elite, is already owned by the elite. This means they can determine who has access to it, i.e., the Right will essentially be unable to produce a state for itself as long as the old one stands. Instead, the Right must realize that dismantling state apparatuses, as a product of the managerial elite, is more efficient than owning most State apparatuses for itself. However, this also may be too challenging to achieve. For example, once the ladder used to scale a wall has been toppled, how do you prevent another from being hoisted back in its place? Or, how do you cauterize a wound to ensure it will not be reopened? Perhaps dismantling many state apparatuses will be too challenging in itself without removing managers, as well. I will discuss this further on Wednesday. To make the point clear, the managerial product, the state, comes with systems and mechanisms intended to benefit the managers over other users. Therefore, the state cannot be effectively managed by anyone but the initial or intended users. I.e., the state will preferentially benefit the managers unconsciously like the slow-moving, multi-headed, and tendrilled behemoth it is.
In the end, the Right cannot expect to become the managers under the current paradigm, just as the capitalists could not expect to be the feudal lords. The function of the Right’s necessary paradigm (if it wants to rule) compared to the Left’s should be the same. However, the substance of their elite rule should be very different. What I think the Right wants is a self-sufficient society where individuals manage matters for themselves, with the proper tools, as any collection of managers can do today. The problem: the production of the ‘proper tools.’ I do not, in any way, have a solution for this conundrum. It is effectively like asking "who watches the watchers," "who manages the managers," or "who produces the means of production?". Yet, this problem must be resolved if the Right wants to overcome the managerial elite. Who will own the productive means of self-sufficient production?
Bibliography
Burnham, J. (1941). What is Happening in the World: The Managerial Revolution. Lume Books.
Burnham, J. (1943). The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. Lume Books.
