Although years have passed since the collapse of the "village market" in the famous story we call globalization, it took the villagers quite some time to realize it. The world had already entered the 21st century with a major security crisis; following the 9/11 attacks, the Islamic world, which constitutes approximately a quarter of the world's population, was categorized in Western public opinion as lepers pushed outside the civilized world's system. Masses attempting to migrate from Africa or Latin America to the modern West were seen as vandals pushed aside regardless of their religious beliefs; upon arrival, they either formed street gangs and produced violence or engaged in organized crime such as drug trafficking, prostitution, and theft. Those classified as compliant were considered insufficiently civilized and uneducated individuals, suitable for menial tasks that the inhabitants of the civilized village would not deign to do. The first crisis of the new century erected a wall of identity far higher than the Berlin Wall among the inhabitants of the global village; it legitimized the psychological fortresses built against those defined as "the other."

The second crisis that disrupted the global village market erupted in 2008 through the global financial system. The model, which presented itself as a story of efficiency and was built on cheap production, rapid logistics, minimum cost, and maximum flow, caused a mass shock. To overcome the crisis, national central banks intervened, forced to flood markets with liquidity, risking inflationary effects, and implemented protectionist measures. Supporting domestic producers and protecting strategic sectors became a prerequisite. The third crisis, triggered by the pandemic, would completely dismantle the system's long-dormant belief in "absolute globalization." Borders returned, and each state protected its citizens in its own way. Economic packages were launched, restrictions were placed on social life, and no tolerance was shown to those who crossed borders. It was clear that the first reflex of states in all crises was to draw borders. The last global crisis of the 21st century emerged in the energy sector when the US, the world's greatest military power, declared war on Iran, the devil that had been pushed to the margins of the global village for decades. Every intervention in the Middle East was expected to yield similar results, since the deepest well, which provided the vital energy for all the villagers, had been closed. Naturally, it was no surprise that the village's marketplace had also fallen into a coma.

The fact that the structure we call the global village or system is built on the principle of efficiency actually creates a serious fragility. Because it is a system forced to rely on scarcity and limited resources. There is a clear division of labor within the structure, and it is imperative for the villagers, working together in a cooperative manner, to always keep the roads open. The most vulnerable are the relatives of the village headman, who play cards in the village coffeehouse and dictate to everyone how they should work. They go hungry if food isn't cooked and placed in front of them, but they always pontificate and decide how things should be in the village! We could even call them the most civilized members of the global system. In the global village, the most visible signs of systemic fragility, the places that will halt the functioning, are the roads leading to the well. Keeping them clean, safe, and open is crucial. Just like in today's world. The most prominent points of fragility are not vast geographical areas; Narrow passages like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Panama, Suez, and Malacca are the invisible backbone of the modern world. The Strait of Hormuz, in particular, can be considered the system's main artery. Approximately one-fifth of the world's oil trade, or about 7.5 billion barrels annually, passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Despite the apparent vastness of the global energy system, this is the clearest indication of its dependence on a narrow physical infrastructure. This is the heart of the world, and every crisis here disrupts the entire rhythm of the global system.

Moreover, even the mere possibility of a disruption, let alone its actual occurrence, is enough to devastate the system. This is because this connection creates not only economic but also strategic and psychological vulnerability. An interruption in energy flow affects not only the oil market or related sectors but also states' perceptions of security, societies' expectations, and leaders' decision-making behavior. Anxiety, uncertainty, and insecurity transform energy policies from rational calculations into strategic reflexes. Iran's decisive position over the Strait of Hormuz traffic, regardless of its military capacity, gives it asymmetrical power precisely for this reason. This crisis stems not from OPEC's (the oil-supplying countries) use of bargaining power, as in 1973, but from the interruption of the flow against their will. In other words, there is a situation they cannot change even if they wanted to. Furthermore, oil and gas markets have become financialized and have moved beyond regionalism to the point of creating fluctuations in spot markets and derivative instruments. This represents a shock across a wide spectrum, no longer definable as a mere energy crisis. We are talking about a giant tsunami that has created a shockwave across the entire political, diplomatic, economic, financial, sociological, and psychological architecture.

Every major crisis undoubtedly has a aftermath. States will learn lessons from this crisis, as they do from others, and will create a new architecture when the war is over. Some predictions are possible. First, we can say that the primary goal in energy transportation will no longer be the "cheapest and fastest route," but rather the search for the "safest and most sustainable route." It is also clear that new alliances and supply lines will be established, emphasizing that energy security is an inseparable part of national security. Indeed, Europe's efforts to reduce its dependence on Russian gas, having learned lessons from the Ukraine war, and China's strategy of diversifying energy and supply lines are concrete reflections of this securitization process. This process will develop through steps such as renewing routes, increasing storage capacity, diversifying energy sources, and developing new and autonomous national and regional energy strategies. Nevertheless, I can say that this will not be a crisis that puts an end to all crises.