"Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?"

This is what Socrates asks Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue bearing in the latter's name.

Gottfried Leibniz formulated the monotheistic version as:

"Is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just?"

It has been claimed to be a problem for the Christian view of God, because it would either make morality arbitrary, or make morality independent of God. But this is actually a false dilemma, and I can prove that by simply offering a third alternative.

What if good stems from the very nature of who God is, from God's attributes, rather than being something God wills into existence, or exists separately from God?

And it's not merely a third option, I think it's a better answer than either option that the false dilemma offers. Morality is not grounded in God's commands, but in God's character.