A fellow named David Phelps @divine_economy pretends to be a deep thinker by posing complex, buzz-wordy, densely loaded questions on esoteric subjects. Perhaps is approach is to confound- thus astound- the Twitter world with his intellect. Fortunately for him, I'm almost never on Twitter. Unfortunately for him, his dumbness has radiated into my mental sphere. And as a student of DAOs, governance and human action, I am obligated to respond to his tweet thread... brutally.

He starts with:

1. The Circle Problem: How can DAOs develop smooth learning curves for newbies to become core contributors? How do we turn rote learning (joining a system) into creative learning (building out a system)?

Jack DuRose mentioned this on the armadaDAO podcast (highly recommended). Circles can be described as areas of expertise. Just because you are a good coder does not mean you are a good graphic designer. A wealth of almost-free knowledge is available on demand, a person simply has to choose to specialize in a field (AKA circle) to prosper.

Ideally, a DAO would have entry-level tasks as well as high-level tasks up for bid. Specialization may be an artifact of the Industrial Era, however with increasing complexity comes the need for specialists. I guess we have to rebrand as "circles".

1. The Rewards Problem: How do we give people *easy* rewards to retain them short-term as individuals, but make them work *hard* to feel close as a community long-term?

Working “hard” is not a bad thing. Tight deadlines and tricky problems to solve make participants flex their skill and grit. The “flat” nature of DAOs enable any participant the ability to bid on a task. Fortune favors the bold. The charge of quality control may fall upon a “manager” in the old model, but substandard work can easily be sussed out in a broad committee of staked participants. Bad graphic design, for example, will just not fly with the DAO crowd full of (theoretically) qualified consumers. And what’s to say your B effort won’t be wildly popular while a 20 year, stodgy Madison Avenue GD’s mediocre effort will be a hit? DAOs level the playing field in a way Mad Men wouldn’t even consider.

via GIPHY

Art and innovation come from the fringes. DAOs enable work to come from the fringes. On spec. Best bring your A game!

1. The inclusion problem: DAOs let anyone compete against corporations. Code replaces compliance; tokens replace marketing; composability replaces R&D as projects build off each other. But teams become tinier than ever. Does letting anybody compete mean letting nobody compete?

This is a very centralized way of thinking; assuming the short attention span of the desired audience (DAO members, which could number in the dozens) is a valid concern. Reviewing a dozen submissions may be tedious for a small team, but a broad network can crowdsource the most popular submissions by merit and (gasp) virality has immediate and free network benefits. Pepe the Frog has no corporate or artistic backing, yet is the most pervasive meme/trope of a generation. Prove me wrong? May the best Pepe win!

1. The positivity problem: DAOs—like NFTs, retweets, and gms—are positive-sum ways to promote one other. That can also incentivize conformism and market manipulation & turn relationships into sponsored ads. How to ensure shilling isn't the least common multiple of relationships?

Nice way to lamely and vaguely differentiate marketing with conformism! Marketing is conformity! You must appeal to a broad audience in this world to stand out. If your work (in marketing) is a hit in the broader metasphere, it is a hit. Plain and simple. Positivity is something you want on your project and you shall adopt it or die in obscurity.

1. The Incentive Problem: Incentives make it easier to coordinate ppl, but can also turn them into mercenaries without self-sovereignty to work on what they like. What are the mechanisms to incentivize ppl to do the work they'd do without incentives?

-- Or –

    Also 5. The incentive problem: DAOs without incentives = ppl join to take initiative, but it's hard for them to coordinate. DAOs with incentives =                  ppl are easy to coordinate, but not there to take initiative. So does right level of incentives depend on level of centralized leadership?

Having been a mercenary -literally- people want your services if you are good. And if you are good, they might pay you more. If they don’t, there is no honor in loyalty. If you want loyalty, go work at Microsoft! The walls are down. You can jump ship from one company to another in this office-less world. Work remote, on the beach, on your terms. That’s the challenge in the current hiring environment, but that challenge is for the hiring managers at Microsoft and less for the DAO mercenaries with a laptop and two middle fingers.

And as a mercenary, I can assure you mercs coordinate betwixt themselves to take the goddamn initiative to achieve the mission. What in the Blue Hell of this Wide Open Cryptospace makes you think that us mercs wouldn’t use every damn tool available to their team to make the mission happen? For enough money I’d have African mercenaries with wire coat hangers dangling from trees for wifi signals in order to make a dev meeting. Lesser miracles have happened.

         6. The Buy-a-State Problem: DAOs are states with treasures, tokens, and governments... but states that individuals can buy out on the open                     market. How do we reward those who work over those who pay?

Simple. Pay for good work and don’t pay for bad work. If all you get is bad work- pay ‘em. Want better work? Bid higher. What State are you referring to? If a “state” is accepting mediocre work, then you have a mediocre state and you should go to work for Microsoft.

1. The Stakeholder Problem: Should everyone get equal votes on governance (as in a democracy)? Or should founders and leaders get greater votes (as in a company)?

Ya got me there! Are DAOs a pure democracy where everyone (staked) votes on the issues of the day? Voting participation is weak in even the most liberal democracies. This isn’t pessimism, it is fact. Not everyone wants to vote on every trivial matter. And, expanding this to a municipality, why would anyone put improvements to the sewer system up to a general vote? I have no idea how sewer systems work, but mine works just fine (thankfully). I would leave the voting to the sewer experts or perhaps delegate my vote to a sewer expert whom has my trust. Same goes with airport, highway and network infrastructure which are highly technical and specialized fields. A wrong decision by anyone might result in catastrophic interruptions in vital service. In a well-run DAO, the participants have their circles of competence (as measured by reputation and results) rather be subject to the whims of popular opinion.

1. The Revenue Problem: In DAOs, memberships and subscriptions are bought as tokens from other members. The DAO doesn't get any revenue. Do they need to find other ways to monetize, or do they need a cut of resales?

This should read "how is development funded?" Development is funded by revenue unless you have long runway of VC funding. In that case, you ain’t in the driver’s seat, friend. Make rev. Fund dev. No one gets rich unless they do the work for the DAO.

1. The Competition Problem: Do a series of DAOs all providing interlocking services and token-swapping end up constituting... a modularized monopoly? Are positive-sum support systems between DAOs healthy or monopolistic? Or both?

One definition of a Monopoly is “one service provider without competition” in so many words. If a series of interlocking DAOs are the only providers of the service, it is not a monopoly if other firms (DAOs) are able to break in and compete. Oligopoly or Cartel would be more apt of a concern. Of course, the cartel’s dominance of the market is due to either fact (OPEC = oil-producing orgs) or by violent dominance (drug cartels). Let me know if anything in the cryptospace represents either of these examples and I’ll join you fighting them.

1. The Visualization Problem: Does visualizing compensation let us confront bias and see what kind of tasks gain the most money? Or does it make us modify our behaviors to compensate the loudest voices?

This is fucking gibberish.

1. The Compensation Problem: Groups are the best judges of individuals' compensation based on performance. But individuals will feel best when they have right to determine their own compensation in advance. Who should decide how much they earn?

Groups (AKA markets) ARE the best judge of performance. Groups (DAOs) can only offer compensation to what they can afford versus what they think the market will pay for. It’s tough but it’s what capitalism is based upon. Anything outside of this is organizational subsidies for mediocre work.

1. The Vibe Problem: The most basic problem. Strong communities come from strong vibes: interpersonal connections on emotional and intellectual level, untouched by questions of compensation. How do we build those in incentive-drive models online? I'll put this as the last, most basic DAO problem. Vibe-checking is crucial for strong communities and compromised when ppl stay for $$ alone. But vibe-building is most important—emotional, spiritual, intellectual openness. And how do we build that online?

You saved the Most Basic Problem for number 12 of 10? Your DAO pays people for their best, most engaging work. See number 11 of 12. If you want good vibes, go hang out in the Pirate Chain Discord to see what a real, self-organizing and high-vibing culture looks like.