I am attempting to present the narrative by tracing data from the past up to the present, ensuring I remain impartial—a necessity given that I hold investments in both ASTS and SpaceX (via the SPCX fund). After all, we are talking about Elon Musk—he is no small-time player. Many others may possess far more knowledge than I do; for my part, I weigh each investment according to its share in my portfolio. Since ASTS accounts for 2–3% of my holdings, I evaluate its risks and upside potential in proportion to that weight. I am not claiming that "ASTS is amazing while Starlink is trash and will amount to nothing"—because, as you will see in this piece, Starlink is a formidable competitor with immense power. If you have anything to add, please feel free to share it with me.

$ASTS | AST SpaceMobile is a company building the first and only space-based cellular network designed to provide direct 4G/5G broadband connectivity to standard, unmodified smartphones—the kind we use every day. That was the case until last Thursday, when $SPCX | Starlink announced its own intention to claim a slice of this pie—a development that introduces a very aggressive player into the market. ASTS currently has 13 satellites in orbit and aims to increase that number to between 45 and 60 by 2027, provided they can secure enough launch capacity. While ASTS did receive a commercial SCS license from the FCC this summer for 248 satellites, Starlink has already secured authorization for 15,000 satellites through 2034. This sets the stage for a competitive landscape between the two.

Starlink’s entry into the fray is not exactly a positive development for us investors, as it challenges the monopoly that ASTS was expected to hold in this sector. Of course, let’s not lose heart just yet; in terms of potential market share, AST SpaceMobile currently holds a position 11–12 times larger than that of Starlink—though this is, naturally, subject to change as Starlink grows its own share. AST SpaceMobile has over 60 partners, led by major players such as AT&T, Verizon, Vodafone, and Rakuten. AT&T (75 MHz) and Verizon (50 MHz) alone contribute a combined 125 MHz of low-band spectrum capacity, and they are key players in the U.S. market. In total, these 60 partners have roughly 3 billion subscribers.

Now, let’s look at Starlink. You might point out that T-Mobile is no longer working with Starlink—which is true—and they currently have no affiliation with AST either, as they are forming various other coalitions. Nevertheless, for the sake of a better comparison, I will include the T-Mobile/Starlink side in this evaluation. I am basing this part of the analysis solely on past agreements, as we cannot predict the future, and the data we have is historical. Starlink has about 7–8 partners that we are aware of, including T-Mobile, Optus, and Rogers. T-Mobile (though its continued involvement with Starlink remains a question mark) contributes 55 MHz, and SpaceX adds 14 MHz, for a total capacity of 69 MHz. Their combined subscriber base is 261 million. As you can see, the gap is significant; however, that alone is not enough—we must also consider the "forward" outlook, or the future roadmap, which is crucial.

Starlink’s greatest advantage is that it controls the entire mechanism, from manufacturing to launch—a major edge over AST SpaceMobile. If you are an ASTS investor like me, the only thing you should be looking at is the launch manifest—neither fundamental nor technical analysis matters much right now. If the AST SpaceMobile management can secure new launch opportunities, it will alleviate the pressure on the stock. However, there is nothing AST can do about this aspect for the time being; they have nearly 50 satellites ready, but that readiness is currently moot. The critical challenge is getting them into space. There are six primary rockets capable of this, one of which is the SpaceX Falcon 9. AST SpaceMobile used it to launch 6 satellites over a 50-day period this summer, but that isn't enough, as the Falcon can only carry 3 satellites per mission. Even if they relied solely on the Falcon, they would need at least 15–20 launches to reach their goal—a capacity that SpaceX neither can nor will provide. We essentially need two specific rockets: Blue Origin’s New Glenn and SpaceX’s Starship. Setting Starship aside for the moment, that leaves us with New Glenn, which is expected to come online in December. If the New Glenn launch platform becomes operational quickly and begins launching the BlueWalker and BlueBird satellites in rapid succession, the current 1.3 [billion/unit] backlog can finally start converting into revenue. New Glenn can carry 8 satellites per launch, meaning the entire task could be completed in just 7–8 launches. That is the whole story.

While on the subject of the backlog, let’s look at the future projections. Growth of 260% is expected for 2027, followed by 184% in 2028. EBITDA is projected to turn positive in 2027. By 2028, both EBITDA and EBIT profitability are possible, though net profitability is not expected before 2029. The company is burning through cash at an alarming rate; it currently holds $3.5 billion in cash. Even if we add the backlog—bringing the total to roughly $4 billion—is that enough? Certainly not. The company needs at least $4.5 billion in cash on hand to make it to 2029. Regrettably, this will likely result in new debt and share dilution.

Now, let’s look at the valuation multiples at which we are taking on these risks. In truth, there aren't many multiples to consider. The only metrics we can really look at are the 2028 EV/Revenue ratio of 11x and the EV/EBITDA ratio of 15x.

I have tried to cover everything in broad strokes. I will conclude by sharing what I have done and what I plan to do next. During a period when certain stocks were surging, I began purchasing shares at $3.17 on February 13, 2024, and later sold them for a profit at $104.73 on February 19, 2026. I took further profits at $103.90 on May 22, 2026. These represent my major entry and exit points, though I engaged in many other trades along the way. On July 24, I made one final incremental purchase at $56.65—I was pleased by the nearly 50% drop, but that was a mistake; I knew that Blue Origin’s New Glenn rocket wouldn’t be ready before 2027. That was clearly an error on my part.

Let me explain why I would continue to buy if the price keeps falling—and there are, in fact, several factors that could drive further declines. Starlink satellites have a lifespan of 5 years, while AST SpaceMobile’s satellites last 7–8 years. The company made a smart move by continuing production; if rockets from Blue Origin or Rocket Lab (the Neutron) become operational by 2027 and begin rapid launches, competitors in the market—seeing that Starlink has moved into the mobile space—will likely knock on AST SpaceMobile’s door, seeking to join the ASTS ecosystem. This wouldn’t mean the end for ASTS, but it could spell the end for terrestrial network operators. AST aims to generate revenue through these terrestrial operators without competing with them directly, whereas Starlink has no such consideration. The relationship between ASTS and terrestrial operators is built on a win-win model. For ASTS, the most critical objective is to get the job done—and quickly. The market is vast—large enough for both ASTS and SpaceX—but the real question is which one will emerge as the "Nvidia" and which as the "AMD" in this race, much like the competition we’ve seen in the GPU sector. As you know, both of those companies delivered strong returns.

In investing, what truly matters is whether you can withstand the worst-case scenario. If a stock is trending upward, there’s no problem; however, even though I’ve already withdrawn my principal and now hold a position with a very low cost basis, I still have to map out a worst-case scenario for myself. I’ve prepared these technical indicators to account for various risks—ranging from a sharp market pullback to the potential loss of satellites—covering the worst-case outcomes short of the company going bankrupt.

ASTS is a long-term, promising company—though not exactly "cheap." They’ve moved past the startup phase, yet they aren’t quite a full-fledged growth company yet. For those who own shares or are looking to buy, I’d suggest using a Dollar-Cost Averaging (DCA) strategy—both on the way down and on the way up. The "space" theme is incredibly powerful and likely to fully mature around 2029–2030. I keep my exposure to this sector at around 2–3% of my portfolio; any more than that, and the inevitable sharp swings could become painful. It’s clear that the next one or two earnings reports will be challenging. I believe I have a firm grasp on the situation. As a bonus, consider this: the current capacity of rocket launch providers isn't sufficient—you might want to look into companies in that space; that’s what I plan to do.