The Israeli election on October 27 is as significant for Washington’s calculations regarding Iran as it is for Benjamin Netanyahu. A week later, the United States will hold its own midterm elections. Although the two leaders may appear to be on the same side, the "success stories" they wish to present to their respective electorates may differ. In an interview with *TIME* magazine published on October 1, Donald Trump—despite being asked several times—did not offer explicit electoral support for Netanyahu, nor did he close the door on his rival, Gadi Eisenkot. It is notable that when asked about Netanyahu, Trump chose to highlight his own track record concerning Israel. In my view, this phrasing suggests that Trump is also concerned with how any future relationship might fit into his own narrative of success.

For Netanyahu, close ties with Washington are an electoral asset. However, if Trump’s support does not appear unconditional, it becomes difficult for Netanyahu to sell the argument that he is the best person to work with the U.S. From Trump’s perspective, Israel’s security, the pressure on Iran, and the energy costs faced by American voters may not always dictate the same policy. A hardline move against Iran might project strength, but if it drives up oil prices, it could carry an economic cost at home. Should Netanyahu win reelection, the composition of his coalition will be crucial; a reliance on hardline partners could hinder the kind of compromise Washington might desire, whereas a stronger political foundation could provide more room for negotiation. Conversely, if he loses, one should not expect an immediate shift toward a softer stance on Iran; his opponents also hold a hardline approach to security. A change in leadership does not automatically equate to a policy of peace.

Uncertainty persists on the Iranian front. In the same *TIME* interview, Trump suggested that an intensification of airstrikes following the U.S. midterm elections is a possibility—though this does not constitute a formal decision to launch an operation. Meanwhile, *Axios* reports that Trump and Netanyahu spoke on October 7. The market impact will depend on the steps taken:
For WTI and Brent crude, the focus will be on shipments through the Strait of Hormuz and the security of energy infrastructure. A genuine threat to supply could increase the risk premium, while a viable resolution could reduce it.
In the case of gold, uncertainty may drive demand for a safe-haven asset; however, a strong dollar and rising real interest rates could limit this support.
The dollar may also see increased demand during a flight to safety, though the economic costs of war and expectations regarding the Federal Reserve add complexity to its outlook.
For U.S. equities, high oil prices could benefit energy producers while raising costs for the transportation and consumer sectors. In the technology sector, the extent to which oil prices influence inflation and interest rate expectations will be a key factor.
The initial signals following the election results, the progress of coalition negotiations, and any concrete steps taken regarding Iran must be considered together. Market pricing will be shaped not only by who emerges from the polls, but also by the terms under which that individual might engage with Washington.