Introduction:
Anthony is on his way to work. He lives in a 21st Century big city. The streets are filled with homeless who choose not to work, the food is unhealthy, he doesn’t know how to cook, crime goes unchecked, and gangs run amuck. Children go to the public schools they’re districted for but they don’t learn anything; there aren’t enough people capable of educating them and the children do not want to learn anyway. They don’t have to either; standards have all but been dissolved. Social well-being is at an all-time low, trust in institutions is nil, and most people are unemployed or not looking for work. Substance use disorder is prolific and sexual immorality is the norm. While this may sound like a conservative’s nightmare, I think it may very well be a potential future for the United States of America if not a contemporary reality.
Literature Review:
To start, I will begin by exploring a series of scientific papers on the causes of America’s decline. The papers do not all study America alone, but when they don’t, the logic produced by them helps to create the framework that allows us to understand what’s happening in America.
For a start, it seems clear that trust is essential for a functioning society. In their 2019 paper, Glatz and Eder found a positive effect of social trust on social well-being (SWB) longitudinally. In other words, the greater the levels of social trust there are in a society, the more social well-being there will be in the long term. Also of note, the authors found “a positive effect of decreasing unemployment and inflation on SWB.” I.e., if there’s institutional trust (or the society is trusting), there’s greater SWB, and if there’s greater SWB, there’s decreasing unemployment and inflation; if there’s institutional trust, then there’s decreasing unemployment and inflation. I.e., where there’s either increasing unemployment or inflation, there’s less SWB and thus institutional trust; where there’s either increasing unemployment or inflation, there’s declining institutional trust. Glatz and Eder’s longitudinal study is also born out by another paper by Helliwell and Wang, 2011.
Given that this paper’s discussion is about the US, I should examine whether trust in the United States is increasing or decreasing specifically. As it turns out, trust has been decreasing in the United States every generation since 1972. In their 2001 paper, Robinson and Jackson explored Robert Putnam’s claim that interpersonal trust in America “[had] eroded in recent decades.” They found that “[g]enerations born up to the 1940s exhibit higher levels of trust, but each generation born after that is less trusting than the one before. [They] note that if successive generations continue to be less and less trusting, then through a process of cohort replacement U.S. society will become pervaded by mistrust.” In another longitudinal analysis done in 2021, Mewes et al. observed that “decreasing confidence in institutions and increasing unemployment scarring may explain about half of the observed declines in US social trust.” We have our contrapositive; i.e., there’s increasing unemployment or inflation, lower SWB, and thus lower or declining institutional trust. But what’s causing the decrease in trust?
In a 2010 paper, Sturgis, Read, and Allum explored whether intelligence fostered social trust. Their findings support the alternative hypothesis that, yes, intelligence does foster social trust. They found that “over their life-course, [the trust of more intelligent individuals] is less often betrayed and they are able to accrue the benefits of norms of reciprocity.” In other words, more intelligent individuals “[foster] greater trust in [their] fellow citizens because [they] are more accurate in their assessments of their trustworthiness of others.” In their 2014 paper, Carl and Billari examined this effect in a cohort from the US. Their findings support the same: “[they] replicat[ed] the association between intelligence and generalized trust in a large, nationally representative sample of US adults.” The authors even found that “after adjusting for intelligence, generalized trust continues to be strongly associated with both self-rated health and happiness.” Thus, we have the likely cause of decreasing levels of social trust in the United States every generation: decreasing intelligence. But are intelligence levels decreasing?
Much ado has been made about the Flynn effect, an increase in education over time causing an increase in IQ, but I haven’t seen any real merit for Flynn’s argument. In their 2010 paper, Rushton and Jensen explore the Flynn effect and the Black-White IQ gap in the United States. Importantly, they found that “[h]eritablities correlate with g-loadings… [w]hile the secular gains are on g-loaded tests (such as the Wechsler), they are negatively correlated with the most g-loaded components of those tests.” I.e., if IQ is increasing but not on the most g-loaded components, the gains are not likely to be heritable. Flynn effects are mainly seen on less g-loaded components. Thus, Flynn effects are not likely to be heritable; the benefits from Flynn effects will likely not be heritable for the generations proceeding from those who benefited from the Flynn effect.
In his 2012 paper, Michael A. Woodley explores the temporal effects on genotypic intelligence and the Flynn Effect. His paper consisted of at least three findings of note: (1) “[the] strongest temporal correlate of the Flynn effect was GDP (PPP) per capita”; (2) “[the] genotypic IQ estimates were significant negative predictors of the Flynn effect”; and (3) “[this latter finding] indicates that the Flynn effect, whilst associated with developmental indicators and wealth, only minimally influences innovation rates, which appear instead to be most strongly promoted or inhibited by changes in genotypic intelligence.” I.e., If Flynn effects are increasing, they’re likely not heritable but will lead to increases in GDP per capita for a time and falling innovation rates. Given that increases in IQ are likely to be Flynn effects, it should follow that innovation rates are decreasing. If innovation rates are not decreasing, increasing intelligence levels are not related to Flynn effects and are likely more heritable.
Unfortunately, based on Johnathan Huebner’s 2005 findings, it appears as if innovation rates are in fact falling and have been falling since 1873. Huebner’s model indicated that “the rate of innovation peaked in the year 1873 and is now rapidly declining. We are at an estimated 85% of the economic limit of technology, and it is projected that we will reach 90% in 2018 and 95% in 2038.” In other words, innovation rates are exponentially declining according to Huebner’s model. Then what is causing the falling levels of heritable intelligence scores? Dysgenic fertility.
In a 2004 paper, Lynn and Court found that “the relation between fertility and intelligence has been consistently negative for successive birth cohorts from 1900 to 1979, indicating the presence of dysgenic fertility for all of the 20th century studied thus far.” In a 2010 paper, Meisenberg found that intelligence “is negatively correlated to the number of children [one has]… This effect is related mainly to the g-factor… by education and income, and to a lesser extent by the more “liberal” gender attitudes of more intelligent people.” So far, these two findings indicate that IQ scores are indeed falling and that less intelligent people are having more children respectively.
To put our argument all together now: there are more less-intelligent people and less intelligent people, IQ scores are falling, this is causing general trust to decline, causing SWB to decline, and thus unemployment or inflation rates to increase. The positive GDP effects related to Flynn effects that Woodley identified are likely a temporal blip and will evaporate as national IQ levels continue to decline (Lynn, Vanhanen, and Stuart, 2002). From this point onward, I would like to express some observations about this matter.
Observations:
The impetus for the writing of this short review and blog was the November 2022 Midterms in the United States. For months, conservative hosts on Fox News, the Daily Wire, and other mainstream conservative outlets spoke of a red wave mostly driven by Latino and Hispanic voters. This simply didn’t happen. Generally speaking, Latino and Hispanic voters voted based on how they have voted for decades: blue. For a long time, individuals like Ben Shapiro and mainstream conservatives have pushed the idea that all one has to do to win over blue or independent voters is give them a reasonable argument; persuade them with “facts and logic.” Well, to put it quite simply: facts and logic won’t work. You simply cannot persuade a population that is unable to understand a complex and nuanced argument and democratic voters have consistently demonstrated they are not capable of understanding complex or nuanced arguments, neither now nor likely in the future.
More importantly, for the Right, this means they should stop wasting their time on the popular vote; they won’t win it; demographic changes are not occurring in their favor. Instead, they should focus on winning over small groups of organized individuals capable of effecting the kind of change they want to occur. But more to the point: if they want a complex and functioning society, they should use that small group of well-organized individuals’ efforts to reverse the observable effects laid out in the literature review section of this paper. In other words, for unemployment and inflation rates to decrease (if conservatives want to live in a complex and functioning society), SWB has to increase, general trust has to increase, and thus intelligent people need to have more children, leading to higher heritable IQ scores. This means the conservatives need to focus their message on the individuals and groups who are being disincentivized from having children, building a family, and creating a complex and functioning society due to current dysgenic effects. It is a waste of time and energy to focus conservatives’ efforts on voters who are incapable of creating a complex and functioning society that innovates: stop pandering.
Secondly, this means the conservatives should stop being afraid of the “R” word. Conservatives are more afraid of the word “Racism” than a cat is afraid of water. But why? The point of this paper is not to answer that kind of question, although I would be willing to bet it has to do with social approval. Instead, what’s more important is that conservatives man up and accept that pandering to voters who generally won’t benefit them, in the long run, is a waste of their precious time. They should focus their efforts on winning over the kinds of voters who will effect the change they want (a functioning, complex, innovative, and orderly society). This likely will not be the kind of people who think nothing of violating our immigration laws or associating with the kind of people who do; it’s that simple. This also likely won’t be the kind of people who think it’s okay for their culture to promote diabetes, heart disease, and sexual immorality. Conservatives need to feel comfortable recognizing that this is not who they are, what they want for their children or posterity, or what they should promote culturally. Conservatives also need to recognize that financially benefiting the kind of people who do contribute to the kind of culture they want likely won’t be the kind of people who are sympathetic towards illegal aliens or twerking TikTok “stars” or anything of their like. Conservatives should feel comfortable with advocating for fiscal policy that puts money into the hands of individuals who will likely produce their functioning, complex, innovative, and orderly society and takes money from those who do not. This means they should stop caring about being called heartless or racist when they talk about taking money from someone who is a net cost to the functioning, complex, innovative, and orderly society they want. It is simply insane and suicidal to subsidize social degeneration. To be afraid of acknowledging this because someone might call you “racist” is to contribute to that social degeneration.
Lastly, the conservatives need to stop pretending that voting matters as much as they claim it does. This doesn’t mean it doesn’t matter, but rather there is something else to consider. And what should they consider? The culture (as I have already highlighted), law, and institutional positions of authority. The law limits what one can or cannot do in a society and where resources go. If the Right’s well-organized minority is able to wield and implement the law in a way that fosters the growth of the kind of culture I am advocating for while disincentivizing the kind of culture at our doorstep, all the better. However, as any student of law ought to be able to tell you, the law is not in the letter but at the end of a stick. In other words, the well-organized minority of conservatives also need to seize positions of authority to enforce the laws they pass or pass on enforcing the laws they don’t want to be enforced. By enforcing the laws they pass, on the books, or ignoring laws that do not benefit them (and having no qualms about doing so – pick up the damn sword and feel proud to carry it!), the culture should abide; and where the culture abides, there too will the Right’s functioning, complex, innovative, and orderly society bloom. While voting is important for this process, the well-organized minority is far more important (Parvini, 2022).
Conclusion:
In conclusion, I do not think the Right’s situation is hopeless per se. Either way, Life will take its course. However, there are some things the Right can do to organize, position, and subsidize itself so that it may extend itself into the future. If the Right wants to keep losing, it will continue to ignore what’s creating a low-trust, economically unviable, and imitative society. If it wants to win, it will begin to recognize the utility of a well-organized, American-centered, and intelligent minority that’s capable of using the authority vested in it to apply the law in a way that generates a culture that preserves its power. The Right needs to understand this is a fight (physical and spiritual) for its survival, not some abstract debate where the person with the “best” ideas wins. If it doesn’t want to do that, it deserves to wither and die.
Importantly, what the Right needs to ultimately recognize is that it needs to go on the offensive. “Playing the game” is precisely the problem. The “game” is not arrayed in their favor. If this means doing everything in their power to destroy the game because it will not allow them to win or be legitimately represented, then they should do it; accepting the outcome of a biased game is to submit to a cheater; why should you submit to a cheater; why should you play that game; why should you accept the outcome of that game? This also means that violence is a genuine possibility and a political reality the Right should feel comfortable deploying; the Left has had and will have no qualms about using violence; the Right absolutely should not either. Of course, the Right will be treated unfairly for deploying this kind of tactic, but they’re already being treated unfairly, so why go down quietly? America’s history is rooted in overthrowing tyrannical leaders; we would be wise to remember that our forefathers did not “play the game” by the King’s rules. If it does not want to win, if it does not want to fight to preserve its heritage and people, it deserves to lose, it deserves its conservative nightmare.
Bibliography:
Carl, N. and Billari, F.C., 2014. Generalized trust and intelligence in the United States. PloS one, 9(3), p.e91786.
Glatz, C. and Eder, A., 2020. Patterns of trust and subjective well-being across Europe: New insights from repeated cross-sectional analyses based on the European social survey 2002–2016. Social Indicators Research, 148(2), pp.417-439.
Huebner, J., 2005. A possible declining trend for worldwide innovation. Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 72(8), pp.980-986.
Lynn, R. and Van Court, M., 2004. New evidence of dysgenic fertility for intelligence in the United States. Intelligence, 32(2), pp.193-201.
Lynn, R., Vanhanen, T. and Stuart, M., 2002. IQ and the wealth of nations. Greenwood Publishing Group.
Meisenberg, G., 2010. The reproduction of intelligence. Intelligence, 38(2), pp.220-230.
Mewes, J., Fairbrother, M., Giordano, G.N., Wu, C. and Wilkes, R., 2021. Experiences matter: A longitudinal study of individual-level sources of declining social trust in the United States. Social Science Research, 95, p.102537.
Morrone, A., Tontoranelli, N. and Ranuzzi, G., 2009. How good is trust?: Measuring trust and its role for the progress of societies.
Parvini, N., 2022. The Populist Delusion.
Robinson, R.V. and Jackson, E.F., 2001. Is trust in others declining in America? An age–period–cohort analysis. Social Science Research, 30(1), pp.117-145.
Rushton, J.P. and Jensen, A.R., 2010. The rise and fall of the Flynn effect as a reason to expect a narrowing of the Black–White IQ gap. Intelligence, 38(2), pp.213-219.
Sturgis, P., Read, S. and Allum, N., 2010. Does intelligence foster generalized trust? An empirical test using the UK birth cohort studies. Intelligence, 38(1), pp.45-54.
Woodley, M.A., 2012. The social and scientific temporal correlates of genotypic intelligence and the Flynn effect. Intelligence, 40(2), pp.189-204.
