Do the Progressives worship the gods of chaos? Maybe. 

The Managerial Revolution was primarily driven by ideology put into praxis. While I think James Burnham does a much better job explaining how ideologies work in Machiavellians, I also think he does a good job of explaining how the Russian and German managerial revolutions unfolded through their use of ideology.

In the Managerial Revolution Burnham lucidly understands what an ideology must be. Any society’s ideology must, according to Burnham, express the ruling class’s interests, aid in the maintenance of the social institutions and structures, and appeal to the masses by expressing some of their interests (p. 173). Burnham argues that, since capitalist ideologies no longer motivate the masses like they used to, Capitalism can no longer serve as the ideology of the ruling classes (p. 174-176).

Managerial ideologies shift the focus from individual power to state power, private enterprise to collective or social enterprise, planning replaces freedom and ‘free initiative,’ talk of rights is transformed into calls for discipline, duty, and order, appeals to opportunity are transfigured into claims about jobs, and an emphasis is placed on the “future, sacrifice, and power” (p. 177). These class 1 derivatives, as Pareto would identify them, inspirited the masses of the German, Russian, and American managerial revolutions. Burnham argues that these differences, specifically the differences between fascist and socialist or communist ideologies, exist mostly in name only but, as I will show, also in how they are carried out. They united, for obvious reasons when you think about it, to destroy the capitalists: the capitalists were their primary political opponent. This can be seen in their attacks on individualism, free enterprise, and opportunity through appeals to the state, collective action, planning, coordination, socialism, and discipline. They are both in contraposition to chaos and anarchy allegedly, which we might assume they believe is partly caused by capitalists (p. 183). Developmentally, managerial ideologies typically take the forms seen in Communist Russia and Fascist Germany if they are fully mature.

Of note, the managerial ideologies will heavily emphasize the importance and impact the managerial class can have on the masses. Through their ideological polemics, the managers argue that “the elite represents, stands for, the people as a whole and their interests”; they are the people’s “vanguard.” Under a fascist managerial structure, there’s no need to cloak the necessity of the elites; however, under a Bolshevik or communist managerial structure, control of the masses is achieved through coercion. The burden of self-education, of the complexities of life, is seen as too much for the common man to handle, and thus the people’s lives must be placed under the manager’s control, essentially making the masses the product or property of the managers. In this way, the communists gain the masses' consent, while the fascists take it because the masses quickly give it to them. In both situations, the people become the managers’ slaves (p. 184). Despite their ideological differences, which are about who should own the state, the communist and fascist managerial arms can unite. Specifically, they do so to consolidate their power and undermine the capitalists’ control over the means of production (p. 187).

I think this paints a good picture of what Burnham means by the Managerial Ideology, but he also provides us with a relatively concise definition of Managerialism, as well: “[Managerialism] contribute[s] through [its] propagation to the development of attitudes and patterns of response which are adverse to the continuance of capitalism and favorable to the development of managerial society, which are adverse to the continued social acceptance of the rule of the capitalists, and favorable to the social acceptance of the rule of the managers” (p. 189). 

When examining the managerial revolutions of Germany, Russia, and the United States, Burnham is primarily concerned about the developmental differences between the three. These developmental differences are rooted in a specific managerial revolution’s local circumstances, how managerial transitions occur, how it is opposed, cultural differences between localities, and the psychological differences between the people shaping the ideology (pp. 189-190). Through the last three chapters, before the book's final chapter, the developmental differences between German Fascism, Russian Communism, and American Technocratic Managerialism are explored.

To understand how the ideologies of the Bolsheviks, Fascists, and New Dealists developed, we must understand the aims of the managers. Firstly, the managers want to defeat the capitalists; secondly, to coerce and acquire the masses' consent (they must accept managerial rule); and lastly, to mitigate competing managerial interests. Any managerial group must account for this latter goal and develop its ideology to inspire the masses to resist the coercive capabilities of other managerial societies (p. 194).

The Russians achieved step one, defeating the capitalists, by using the masses to overthrow the capitalists (p. 195). However, once the capitalists were removed, the workers were left to administer the Russian industrial sector for themselves. Without the technical capacity to manage the industrial economy, the workers quickly had to turn to the Bolshevik managers. The workers also were dispirited from the dream of a “classless society.” This line of logic quickly dawned on them: A classless society should, by definition, have no classes; the workers are a class within any society; therefore, a classless society should have no workers. The workers knew they could not achieve a classless society and, thus, had fewer concerns about letting the Bolshevik managers run their affairs for them (p. 198). When the workers resisted, if they did (and they did), then the managers had to reeducate them, and when this didn’t work, they lined them up against a wall and shot them (pp. 199-200).

In form, this is the process the Russians took: they manipulated the masses to kill or remove the capitalists; when the masses were in disarray, they stepped in to control the chaos; and lastly, if any of the masses resisted, the managers, through executive agencies and bureaucracies, quickly suppressed them with violence and reeducation (pp. 201-202). Burnham defines this process as Leninism-Stalinism, which is a “social ideology rationalizing the social interests of the new rulers [the managers] and making them acceptable to the minds of the masses” (p. 206).

Germany’s revolution occurred differently. The German Revolution was significantly influenced by the conditions the Germans found themselves in after WWI. “She had just been defeated in the greatest war fought up to that time and had been compelled to sign the harshest peace terms in modern European history.” She lost “important sections of her territory” and was surrounded by “satellite states of her enemies.” She also lost “her colonies… merchant marine… and navy… and her army was reduced to a minimum figure.” The German people were exhausted by war as her people's woes doubled through a concurrent famine. “She was saddled with reparations not merely in money – which she did pay largely through borrowings – but in kind, which latter meant the loss of material goods.” Germany's enemies “carved up all the juiciest slices of the world in what they took to be their own interests.” These were Germany’s conditions before the managerial revolution (p. 218).

Many critics of the German managerial economy thought she was in the throes of a decadent spiral. Yet, Burnham disagreed with this perspective. Germany’s problems after WWI motivated their managerial class to take power. They found a problem and were happy to resolve it. Their ability to overcome unemployment, and inflation, engage in rapid territorial expansion, prepare for war, acquire the loyalty of their people, the age of the leaders (specifically their youth), and their effective spy and intelligence networks were all a sign of a renewing Germany, not a decadent Germany (pp. 119-220). The German managerial revolution brought her back from the brink, a task their capitalists could not achieve.

Burnham argues, quite convincingly (contrary to many Americans and Marxists), that Germany was not a capitalist society (pp. 221-223). The capitalists in Germany effectively recognized that they were impotent against the German managerial class and generally decided to drop out of the social game against them. However, some capitalists recognized the power shift and opted to join the managerial revolution by becoming managers themselves (p. 223). This significantly benefitted the Germans. In Russia, most of the capitalists were removed when the Bolsheviks used the workers to oust them, preventing their integration into the managerial class. But in Germany, the capitalists were given a chance to join the managers. What this meant was that Germany was qualitatively more competent than the Russians. The German managerial class benefited from the previously existing capitalist networks and resources while the Russians had to generate these for themselves. This qualitative managerial difference meant the Germans were bound to be (and were) more technologically proficient than the Russians, better equipped, more knowledgeable, and better at resolving the issues they had laid out before them caused by WWI.

The German ideological takeover was partially reversed from the Russian’s. The Germans' dispute with the socialists within and without their borders was used to win the hearts and minds of the people by appealing to the capitalists. This consolidated the people to the managers’ will while leaving the capitalists in place. This was, then, followed by the capitalists’ gradual removal, leaving the better capitalists to join the managers' ranks (p. 228). Lastly, the managers were left to consolidate their power over any other, competing managerial groups, like the Bolsheviks in Eastern Europe.

Burnham considers the European war as an attempt to destroy European capitalist rule utterly. If the Germans were to have failed (which they did), Britain would be put in the same position as Germany and have the same managerial control over Europe or have to enter into a deal with the rest of Europe because it would be a strategic base of global dominance (which Britain did) (pp. 230-231).

For the Germans, war was a significant part of their ideological operation. War served to spread Germany’s managerial ideology throughout Europe; secondly, opposing nations were forced to adopt the managerial model if they wanted to resist the Germans or survive (which confirmed the German’s message); lastly, war quickened the pace at which the German managers secured dominance over the German economy and ousted the capitalists.

When people faced the realities in Germany and Europe, they knew capitalism couldn’t resolve their issues, and as an ideology, it couldn’t motivate them. The Germans knew it was Managerialism or nothing; Socialism was and is an incoherent philosophy that leads to Managerialism, and Capitalism failed to preserve the German people in their time of greatest need: The Great War (p. 234). This ensured managerial control throughout Germany and Europe, even if Germany failed.

In America, the Managerial Revolution was accelerated by “New Dealism” (p. 238). Many people attribute the New Deal to President Roosevelt. According to Burnham, Roosevelt wasn’t required to implement the New Deal. Whether Roosevelt was in power, the managers would push the New Deal (p. 239). The New Deal movement faced significant resistance from the Republicans and some of the more laissez-faire liberals, however. Burnham reconciled the Republican’s resistance to the New Deal and expanded executive bureaucracies and powers by recognizing that they were more capitalist than the managers. The Republicans were a party that established themselves during the midst of the American Civil War and, thus, executive expansion within the United States. Therefore, to many people, it was surprising to see them resist the New Deal. To put it simply: The Republicans resisted the New Deal, despite being advocates of executive power, because the New Deal benefited the managerialists, not capitalists and, thus, not Republicans (p. 242).  

In America, propaganda and slogans played a significant role in the managerial ideology's propagation. This curbed the masses' resistance to the New Deal by getting them to buy into it. The slogans of the managers “weaken[ed] confidence in the basic ideas and slogans supporting capitalist institutions, and populariz[ed] ideas and slogans suited to the transition to the managerial structure” (p. 242). This was aided by the fact that capitalist slogans had lost much of their power over Americans by the New Deal era (p. 244). No one wanted to hear during the middle of the Great Depression how they just needed to pick themselves up by their bootstraps. As I have covered in a previous paper, many venture capitalists felt this way, as well; they began to invest far more in state enterprises rather than private enterprises by the New Deal’s passing, which was accelerated by the managerial class’s effectiveness.

The capitalists couldn't win the managerial conflict because they couldn’t make South America profitable nor integrate it into an American super-state (p. 248). They also couldn’t produce armaments as effectively as the managers and, thus, would be unable to prepare for wartime conflict like the managers. Lastly, the capitalist ideology couldn’t promote enough military fervor to recruit troops for the war effort (p. 250). Just as no one wants to die for Marvel or Harry Potter movies, no one wanted to die for a chance to stand in bread lines again.

Burnham believes the U.S. would assert itself as a world power through managerial control if three necessary conditions were met. Firstly, it had to unify inherently (p., 246); secondly, it needed to gain control over the Western Hemisphere (p. 246-247); lastly, it needed to demonstrate its capacities by engaging in conflict with the European and Asiatic superpowers (p. 247). Because the capitalists couldn’t achieve this, and America was being thrust into another war, it was left to accept the managerialists’ social structure or die.

In many ways, the American managerial revolution mirrored the German managerial revolution. It initially consolidated its power by acquiring wealth through capitalist investment in the state. It then expanded its powers and convinced or coerced the masses to join it (e.g., it had Roosevelt elected). Lastly, it used the masses' democratic will to effectuate the New Deal, consolidating managerial or executive control in the United States, preparing it for war with Europe and Asia (p. 252-253), and pushing out and neutering the capitalists’ will. However, the American variant spread more slowly than the German. Still, once the war had broken out, Burnham believed it would spread more rapidly throughout American society because the Americans would have no choice but to accept managerialism; if they didn’t the Germans and Japanese would win (p. 253).

Contemporarily, the ideological mode of the progressives differs only in detail, but from the formal revolutionary structure of the German, American, and Russian revolutions, we can identify it. The contemporary ideological revolution benefits from chaos. The appeal to order has not left the progressives or conservatives, but it has taken a backseat for the progressives. By generating chaos, releasing criminals, advocating for lighter drug penalties, defunding the police, and failing to care for the mentally ill, at least, the progressives (the new managerial class) can then stand up and say, “I can solve your problems for you, just give me control over your administrative and police institutions.” With control of these institutions, the new managerial class can control the state as a product, and the lives of the state’s people. When this occurs, the people’s well-being (i.e., the people themselves) becomes the managerial class’s product. Thus, the people become the managers’ property, they own the people absolutely. What the progressives are inevitably advocating for is a slave state. This is what the managers want.

Contemporary managers benefit from chaos at all levels. They want to destroy children's innocence because that will make those children dependent on them in the future. They want to undermine the family unit because that will make single mothers and their children dependent on the state. They want to cause crime and disarm the populace because that will corral them into the state’s arms, ensuring managerial control over the people’s actions at every level. I would be surprised if they weren’t undermining the dollar to create a more manageable digital currency than their paper currency, enabling more social control over their product: the state and her people. Chaos is the contemporary mechanism by which the progressives, the modern managerial class, takes control of the population.

The managerial class also benefits from causing chaos on the Right. By aggravating the Right and giving them a reason to react, the managers can react in kind with the use of the administrative state by tamping down on the people, expanding the state’s power, and setting a juridical precedent that stands to uphold their authority in the future. At all levels, by making things worse, the progressives believe they can expand their managerial control, even if that control is only over their civilization’s ruins.

This chaos-loving managerialism is partly related to the modern, progressive managerial class’s quality. For at least forty years, the United States has incentivized hiring and educating people who are or were not as competent as their forebearers through its administrative agencies and policies. Burnham notes how this occurred at progressive institutions when professors gave higher or passing grades to students whose work deserved lower or non-passing grades. This grade inflation still occurs. Yet, it was also used to benefit many disparately impacted ethnic groups or voting blocs, according to the progressives. At its core, the disparate impact argument is circular reasoning and is only promulgated through the progressive’s control over managerial institutions. These blocs benefited from the progressive managers' handouts while hiding their faults behind an appeal to bona fides. Still, you cannot hide the consequences of promoting incompetent people. The consequences of hiring these incompetent people have made the American civilization more inefficient and less capable. Because a civilization’s quality is defined by its elites, and the quality of America’s elites has drastically fallen over the last forty years, at least, America has been qualitatively diminished. For nations like China and Russia, this qualitative fall is fantastic. For Americans and the West, America's elite degeneration through the over-inclusivity of unqualified people could mean a brutal and bloody collapse.

Thus, the Manager’s current ideological processes are as follows: Firstly, abdicate managerial responsibilities or undermine the mass’s ability to resolve their own problems. Producing a period of chaos, the managers force the masses into their arms and under their executive powers and institutions. Secondly, once executive rule is reestablished, the managerial class can use the people (who they effectively own and thus control) to complete the goals they desire, which are not necessarily constrained by profits. Anyone who disagrees with the managerial class’s desires is painted as an anachronistic blemish from a bygone and chaotic era, like the 50s, that must be removed. Lastly, internal or external managerial resistance parties need to be dealt with. Russia and Germany achieved this through purges and expulsions, and America, Russia, and Germany eventually engaged in mutual conflict for control over the strategic, European base. The modern progressives purge their competition by limiting or prohibiting their influence (i.e., canceling them), jailing them, or worse, and it seems to me like they're preparing for conflict with Russia and China. In part, the progressives slowly purge their enemies, giving them a chance to join their regime. Yet, their contemporary regime is racially and sexually defined, as well: White men shouldn't be managers under their regime and, thus, only serve to feed the manager’s beast. It's, thus, unreasonable for most White Men to participate in this charade, which is also exactly what the progressives want.  The progressive, American managerial state effectuates its racial purge through corporate investment and executive control over those corporations; perhaps you'd like to undergo another DEI training. There’s no hiding it, either; that’s what it is: a racial purge of White Men. As this occurs, America will prepare for conflict with the Asiatic base because they are their greatest managerial competition externally. Ironically, the American progressives' ideological mode mirrors the German fascists’ mode.

While it is useless and pathetic to call the progressives fascists, it is useful information when deciding what should be done about them. After all, Burnham’s thesis was essentially a scientific one. What we feel about its conclusions is irrelevant. Burnham’s statements approach the truth or they do not, and I think they are more true than false. Although there are many ways to spin it, in the end, I’d rather have the truth than a comforting lie, and for his attempt at reaching the truth, I thank James Burnham.

Bibliography

Burnham, J. (1941). What is Happening in the World: The Managerial Revolution. Lume Books.

Burnham, J. (1943). The Machiavellians: Defenders of Freedom. Lume Books.