We’ve said we are going to have a look at some of the cruise missile and drone platforms currently involved in the Ukrainian conflict and also do an analysis on stockpile levels where we can. And whilst there’s been plenty of cold war era cruise missiles that have been fired over past 12 months, and we’ve seen many quick rigged or modified weapons as well, we thought we would start with the oddball that we’ve all seen footage of first. Namely the Iranian built but little known Shahed family of drone / missile platforms.
The Shahed is a recent development in the drone world, with first footage being released in just 2021. Its a cheaply designed loitering munition that is designed for both recon purposes and ground attack. Coming in many different variants, but focusing on the Shahed 176 and Shahed 131 these drones are designed to provide a cheap, mobile and fast launching platform that can be multi role, performing both ground attack (primary) and reconnaissance / BDA (secondary). Whilst believed to be used prior to the Ukraine War the platforms really came to world attention when they were used by the Russian Military in an attempt to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses without depleting the last of the stockpile of cold war cruise missiles.
The Shahed’s didn’t turn up untill, after the push towards Kyiv by Russian forces was given up as a failure. Switching to barrage tactics where almost anything in the inventory was fired, the Shahed’s came on to the scene to keep pressure on Ukrainian infrastructure without leaving RU toothless regards its cruise missile inventory. Its known by around Dec 22, that thousands of cruise missiles had been fired at Ukrainian infrastructure. While its a little tricky to exactly corroborate numbers without performing some serious OSINT and data analysis we do know that the following types were fired on at least one occasion:
1. 3M-54 Kalibr
2. KH-101
3. KH-555
4. 9K720 Iskander
5. S300 Surface to Air Missiles (Ground Attack Mode)
6. Tornado Rockets
7. KH-22
8. KH-47M2 Khinzal
Its worth mentioning that some of these missiles were dual role, and capable of being fitted with either conventional or nuclear warheads and sometimes being designed to attack western naval groups. Because of this, some weren’t particularly accurate, with the KH-22 for example, having a CEP (circle error probable) of around 200-300 meters. In a naval strike, fitted with a nuclear warhead to be fired at a naval taskforce this isn't a huge concern, but fired into built up areas with conventional warheads (or possible even a cement ballast as has been seen during this conflict) means they are quite inaccurate. This means civilian losses as seen, are quite high as many targets require repeated attacks to ensure destruction. With a limited production capacity to procure replacements the effect of mass missile attacks on stretched supply lines would only increase over time.
That same effect also became relevant on artillery shell stockpiles, with tens of thousands being fired daily. With a need to continue, or even increase the rate of fire, an additional source of weapons to continue the conflict would be needed. With Russia heavily sanctioned and becoming isolated due to the initial attack it would be time to turn to the allied nations that remained.
The first Shahed to be used against Ukraine was the 136. This weapon was designed to be a cheap, effective weapon that could be used in a mobile capacity to conduct massed missile strikes against ground targets. Unique in comparison to western designs the Shahed came with a number of ingenious features that were suited to use in the Islamic Republic, which when combined with a low level of complexity gave life to a strike weapon that could be mass produced relatively cheaply whilst remaining mobile enough to be reliable for dispersed operations. These features meant that the Shahed could be used to overcome air defenses as any weapon demands attention, particularly one that carries a 50kg (110lb) warhead.
Launched in multiples of up to 5 from a single launcher rack that can easily be fitted to civilian vehicles if suitable military trucks are unavailable, the rack provides a stack-able and easily transportable solution to getting the Shahed into the conflict zone.
Relatively small for a drone and weighing around 200kg, the first point of interest is the propulsion system. While a jet engine would increase both the weight and size penalty and comes with an extremely high overhead in regards to cost and design a simple 2 blade pusher propeller is used that is driven by a piston engine. Whilst this gives a reasonably slow cruise speed of less than 200km/h it does keep the overall cost of the platform down, meaning more weapons can be produced to contribute to the fight.
The second area that helps to keep costs down is the electronics and guidance systems that help the weapon navigate and conduct its attacks. With little information on these systems prior to the types use in Ukraine, weapons recovered in 2022 showed a number of interesting components that did not appear to be Iranian in design. Despite being fitted in unmarked and unserailised housings, the craft showed a number of western designed electronics and components, which would give an acceptable level of operation with the additional benefits of reasonably streamlined parts acquisitions combined with the reliability levels of off the shelf components.
Whilst its unable to be exact on production numbers and levels, the Shahed was given to Russia in 2022, giving RU the ability to maintain massed missile attacks without having to rely on its own inventory. This relationship was mutually beneficial with the engineers and designers of the Shahed being able to obtain feedback and testing information to increase the designs efficiency and validate the types combat effectiveness and accuracy. Given the name Geranium-2 (Герань-2) in Russian service these tests would be fast to begin.
Is it a Bird? A Plane?
One of the issues found by UA pilots was that the drone was reasonably difficult to track. Despite not being a stealthy design, the small size of the type combined with its low altitude and reasonably slow cruise speed meant that the MiG-29’s used predominantly by the UA air force had a difficult time tracking and engaging the weapon due to deficiencies in the soviet era radar and R73 missiles. This meant that for the most part the 30mm cannon became the engagement weapon of choice, however this put the airframe and pilot at additional risk by not just the range involved but also by flying the MiG-29 closer to its airframe limits. This risk played out entirely on the 13th of October 2022 when a Ukrainian MiG-29 was lost after shooting at a Shahed during a missile strike. While the fog of war remains murky on this one its believed the type was lost due to the missile exploding during the attack, damaging the UA aircraft’s cockpit and airframe requiring pilot ejection and ending in a total loss.
A Financial Quandary:
The operation of the Shahed against UA assets soon revealed a frustrating problem, similar to the one faced by mass consumer drones being adapted for combat operations. The cost of defending against the Shahed effectively soon revealed an imbalance in the cost to defend in comparison to the cost of deploying the system. With some estimates for the aircraft’s production costs being as low as $20,000 the usage of S300, star streak and other surface to air missile systems meant that defending against these attacks became a costly and constant expense to the UA war effort. With the Ukrainian military all about innovation, this meant that in some ways air defense systems went a full circle reversion to guns and anti aircraft artillery became more valuable due to being a far more effective way of defending against these types of attacks. This meant that the soviet era ZSU-23-4and the german designed SPAAG mobile AA systems found increased value with even lighter weapons like the DShK being modified being for the same purpose. It also meant that the development of future western systems also became prioritized, with a number of new kinetic designs that could be used to intercept these cheaper massed attacks effectively.
The other side of this cost issue became the cost to civilian infrastructure despite attempting to intercept and mitigate the attacks where possible. With even damaged drones still providing a debris issue and plenty still getting through air defense systems, this cost was soon realized when the electrical system sustained heavy and consistent damage to its infrastructure. Despite the best efforts of the countries engineers the effect of the attacks during the winter meant the conditions within the country were incredibly harsh, with UA attempting to offset this effect on its people by providing pop up locations with generators, heating and the ability to charge phones and achieve some form of minor reprieve from discomfort. Its worth considering that the knowledge obtained by these civilian engineers will be valuable to the world at large post conflict, as the ability to effectively maintain or restore power to areas has a large non military benefit as well. Providing a way to restore services or use temporary facilities is a priority after any natural disaster, meaning that the engineers who’ve assisted in the effort to keep the lights on in their country have a large wealth of knowledge to return to the worlds engineering community.
In Closing:
With the 3 day “Special Military Operation” being over a year old now, and the conflict still active its a little tricky to answer the question of what next. With sanctions providing parts issues and a limited capacity to produce the components needed to replenish the stockpile, this means Russia is reliant on exports to have full production capability. With imposed limited production abilities for the immediate future, the Shahed will remain relevant for as long as Russia is willing to fire them and however long Iran will supply them for. This means that the production missiles can either also be contributed to the attack, or diverted to replenish the stockpile that has already been fired. With still having a reasonably large store to draw from, it appears that RU has enough left in its post soviet stockpile to continue the attacks for some time to come yet. However UA will continue to adapt and rebuild after these attacks, as it has done to now. The will of Ukraine and its people remains strong.
