https://suzdalnitski.medium.com/oop-will-make-you-suffer-846d072b4dce
Object-Oriented Programming is The Biggest Mistake of Computer Science
https://suzdalnitski.medium.com/oop-design-patterns-bd2c4fb3014c
Lion Air Flight 610
Oct. 29, 2018
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lion_Air_Flight_610
Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 with 157 on board
March 10, 2019
https://nl.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ethiopian_Airlines-vlucht_302 hhhhhh
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/boeing-737-max-crisis-2019-news-coverage/
The weekend after the second crash, a Seattle Times front-page story — citing proprietary Boeing information submitted to the FAA — laid bare how the federal regulator was not fully informed as Boeing expanded the powers of its MCAS flight control system, the automated software whose malfunctioning killed 346 people.
https://projects.seattletimes.com/2019/boeing-737-max-12-problems/
The flights were eerily similar, just minutes long, with pilots engaged in a terrifying battle against an automated safety system that ultimately sent the 737 MAX jets plunging to earth.
But the journeys of Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302 also contained some stark differences. The pilots in the second crash had the lessons of the first, with new guidelines from Boeing and the FAA. They tried to follow instructions for recovering the jet. It still wasn’t enough.
We’ve written before about competitive pressures that resulted in a rush to build the MAX, the flawed analysis behind the new, automated system called MCAS (Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System), the FAA’s shift to delegating certification tasks to Boeing, and internal pressures at Boeing to advance planes to completion.
Problem 1
Even before takeoff with 189 people on board, the data on Lion Air 610 showed evidence of a problem. As the plane taxied, the two angle-of-attack (AOA) sensors on the nose of the jet recorded starkly different values. The left sensor was clearly wrong — the plane was still on the ground — but the aircraft didn’t recognize the discrepancy.
Problem 2
Those sensors are critical. While some airplanes, particularly those from Boeing rival Airbus, have three such sensors that can work with one another in the case of an erroneous value, Boeing’s 737 MAX has just two, and the aircraft used only one of those sensors to trigger a new automated system — MCAS — that would force the nose of the plane down if the sensor indicated a potential stall. Records also show that previous flights of this aircraft had problems with the angle-of-attack sensor.
https://betterprogramming.pub/object-oriented-programming-the-trillion-dollar-disaster-92a4b666c7c7
